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Executive summary 
The purpose of this thesis is to estimate the equity value, thereby estimating value per share of 
Manchester United Plc, henceforth referred to as Manchester United or United. Valuation date 
is June 30th, 2019, and by comparing with market share price the same day, an investment 
recommendation is issued.  
The framework for this thesis is based on Palepu, Healy and Peek’s textbook Business 
analysis and valuation. A presentation of Manchester United and the football industry is 
followed by a strategic and financial statement analysis, serving as basis for a prospective 
analysis including forecast and valuation. 
A look into Manchester United and the football industry uncovers a growing multi-billion 
industry driven by increasing broadcasting revenues. The strategic analysis reveals industry 
profitability faces threats from increasing player wages and illegal streaming. With brand 
awareness and organizational structuring, United maintain a competitive advantage through 
capitalizing on a strong brand. Investment in scouting network and homegrown players, is 
expected to positively affect future earnings and cashflows. Homegrown players, 
controversially carry book value of zero, reducing amortization and employee benefits 
compared to buying established star players.  
The financial statement analysis discloses Manchester United as a well driven business 
compared to their peers. In spite of mediocre sporting results, the club has maintained a 
profitable level. Forecasted financial statements are influenced by diminishing broadcasting 
revenue growth and an increasing NOPAT margin due to reduction of amortizations and 
player wages. 
In direct valuation methods based on the dividend discount model, expected future earnings 
and cashflows are discounted at estimated cost of equity. Equity value is calculated at 2221 
million GBP, translated into an estimated value per share of 17.19 USD. Comparing with 
market share value of 18.25 USD concludes Manchester United’s equity is fairly priced, 
hence a “hold” recommendation is issued. 
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Preface 
Ever since my older brother gave me a Manchester United jersey kit as a young kid, I have 
been a loyal supporter. Knowing the club as a large business unit, I was intrigued by 
performing a valuation of Manchester United, as it would be a summary of the master’s 
programme studies, as well as getting insights into an organization I truly care about.  
 
During the time of writing this thesis, a pandemic hit the world in the form of the coronavirus 
Covid-19. Hundreds of thousands have died and many more are dying as these words are 
written. My deepest condolences go to those suffering losses. 
 
Large parts of society, including the football industry, are put on hold and the extent of the 
consequences are still unknown. In terms of affecting the valuation, my choice is to ignore 
any consequences from the pandemic. This is based on the amount of unknown consequences 
and an assumption that unless it causes significant changes to the industry structure, future 
long-term profitability will not be affected. History shows the world economy always bounce 
back from a crisis. A short-term reduction in growth rates and profitability is bound to be 
replaced by higher measures later on, not changing the overall picture for the underlying 
value of the company. 
 
The process of writing this thesis has been a challenging and educational process. I would 
sincerely like to thank my supervisor Simone Traini for useful and encouraging feedback. 
Also, thanks to my therapist Merete Torvanger for support through a difficult period. Last and 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this master thesis is to estimate the value of Manchester United’s equity from 
a neutral investor’s perspective, thereby estimating the value per share. Valuation date is June 
30th, 2019, the end date of their last financial statement. The valuation is based on a business 
analysis and fundamental valuation techniques and aims to reflect the underlying values of the 
company. Estimated share value will be compared to market share value and an investment 
recommendation will be issued. 
 
1.2 Limitations 
Analysis in this thesis are based on external information available to the public. As the club 
distinguishes itself as a single operating unit, analysis will be on group level only. The main 
product is the entertainment of watching a football match, either live at the stadium or on a 
media platform. The industry is limited to football clubs in the European countries’ top 
leagues with a realistic chance to win national and international titles. The geographic 
limitation falls natural as they are all under the same organizational umbrella of UEFA and 
connected through the race for winning the Champions League, which is widely respected as 
the most prestigious event on club level. Time frame limitations and comparative peers will 
be accounted for in section 4.1 Framework for financial analysis. 
 
1.3 Structure  
The structure of the thesis is based on the framework of the textbook Business analysis and 
valuation by Palepu, Healy and Peek. Chapter 2 includes a presentation of Manchester United 
and the football industry. Chapter 3 is a strategic analysis. In the strategic analysis an industry 
analysis gathers insights on factors affecting the industry profitability, a competitive analysis 
looks into how Manchester United capture that profitability and a corporate analysis covers 
economic synergies at corporate level. At the end of the chapter follows a section on risks 
Manchester United are exposed to. 
 
Following the strategic analysis is a financial statement analysis in chapters 4-6, consisting of 
accounting analysis and financial analysis. In the accounting analysis critical accounting 
policies and estimates is looked into and Manchester United’s financial statements is 
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reformulated and adjusted for analytical purposes. The financial analysis consists of ratio 
analysis of profitability, leverage and sustainable growth, in addition to a cash flow analysis.  
 
The strategic and financial statement analysis serves as basis for the prospective analysis in 
chapter 7 and 8. Chapter 7 presents forecasted financial statements for Manchester United. In 
chapter 8, valuation method is chosen, and associated discount rate is estimated, before the 



















Figure 1.1 Structure of the thesis 
2 The football industry and Manchester United 
Football is commonly recognized as the world’s most popular sport and it has become a 
multi-billion industry. With revenues of more than £ 600 million in 2019, Manchester United 
is one of the top actors in the industry. This chapter contains a presentation of the football 
industry and Manchester United Football Club. 
 
2.1 The football industry 
2.1.1 The beginning 
The game of football has its spring from Chinese military exercises dating back to the second 
century BC. The game consisted of kicking a leather ball into a small net connected to long 
bamboo canes. However, the modern organized football as known today, found its place when 
Rugby split into Football and Rugby the year of 1863 (FIFA, n.d.). That same year the 
THE FOOTBALL INDUSTRY & MANCHESTER UNITED 
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 
 
FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS 
Accounting analysis        Financial analysis  
PROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 
Forecast            Valuation 
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Football Association of England (FA) was formed and is today widely acknowledged as the 
beginning of the football history. By 1872 the FA Cup was established, considered the first 
football tournament, and by 1888 the first league championship started (FIFA, n.d.). The first 
international game was held in 1872 in a game where Scotland and England drew 0-0.  
 
Since the beginning, football has steadily grown to become the world’s most popular sport 
(Sawe, 2018). The governing head of international football, Fédération Internationale de 
Football Association (FIFA) was founded in 1904 by seven initial member countries. By 
1930, the year of the first World Cup, the number had grown to 36. After the Second World 
War in 1950, the number had reached 73. By September 2019, the number of member 
countries is 211 (FIFA, n.d.).  
 
2.1.2 Organizational structure 
The 211 member countries are divided into six confederations, one for each continent. The 
European confederation UEFA is the organizer of the European club tournaments Champions 
League and Europa League, which plays an important part in the industry because of large 
prize money pools and worldwide broadcasting exposure. 
 
In addition to FIFA and UEFA, each country has their own footballing governing body 
dealing with domestic tournaments and regulations. In England the head of football is the 
English Football Association (FA). In 1992 the Premier League was founded, as the top 
division in England decided to make their own organization. The Premier League is still 













Fig. 2-1 Organizational structure of football 
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2.1.3 Todays football industry 
European dominance 
Europe is considered the footballing center both from a sporting and an economic point of 
view. It is commonly known the European top clubs buy the best players and pay the highest 
wages. Statistics from the World Club Championship, where continental tournament winners 
from all the confederations compete, illustrates the European domination. Of the last 13 
winners only one is non-European, Corinthians in 2013 (Transfermarkt, n.d.-a). In addition, 
all four semi-finalists of the 2018 FIFA World cup in Russia were European, underlining the 
European domination. A sole factor stirring up the European supremacy is Brazil’s record 
breaking five World cup trophies. 
 
The last few years China has invested vast amounts of money into developing their league. 
Renowned players and managers are attracted through high wages. Whether the effort will be 
rewarded into sporting success and worldwide popularity competing with the likes of 
Manchester United is yet to see. A similar approach in the 70’s in North America did not 
create the expected results, in spite of attracting superstars like Cruyff, Best and Pelé.  
 
Revenue growth 
Today’s football industry is a growing industry, driven by increasing commercial and 
broadcasting revenues. This growth can be connected to the introduction and expansion of 
digital media. Social media on digital platforms has brought the clubs and players closer to 
the fans and strengthened the bonding between the parties, while at the same time stimulating 
worldwide interest for the club. A feature to illustrate the growth is the top-5 clubs’ revenue 
as shown in figure 2-2. Regulars in top-5 include Manchester United, Real Madrid, Barcelona 
and Bayern München. From figure 2-2 we see no noticeable effect of the worldwide recession 
2008-09, which could be due to the clubs mainly operating on long term contracts with its’ 
stakeholders while at the same time showing a strong deep-rooted popularity of football. 
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Figure 2-2 Average revenue top-5  (Deloitte, 2019) 
 
Profitability 
In spite of being a multi-billion industry, the football industry is also known as an industry 
chasing trophies and glory at almost any cost, often resulting in hazardous investments and 
red numbers for the accountants. Only since 2017 the European clubs have shown an 
aggregate bottom line profit. Figure 2-3 illustrates a change in the footballing profitability 
landscape for the Europe’s top division clubs.  
 
 
Figure 2-3 Aggregate European club’s profit (UEFA, 2020, p. 111) 
 
2.1.4 The elite 
The elite of European football and Manchester United’s main competitors are clubs  
with a realistic chance to win domestic and international league and cup titles on a regular 
basis. Included here are the top-13 teams (fig.2-4) from KPMG’s list of the 32 most valuable 
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clubs’ enterprise value influenced by five key metrics. These five parameters include 
profitability, popularity, sporting potential, broadcasting rights and stadium ownership. To 
support KPMG’s results, Deloitte have the same 13 clubs as the most revenue generating 
clubs in their 2019 Money League Report (Deloitte, 2019). These clubs compete for much of 
the same players, coaching staff, prize pool and commercial deals. 
 
From a sporting level of view, 24 of the last 28 Champions League semi-finalists are from 
this top-13 elite group (UEFA, n.d.), indicating small chances for other teams to be regular 
contenders for the Champions League title. The Champions league is widely accepted as the 
world’s biggest club tournament. The collection of the best players in the world, high prize 
money and large international media exposure makes it a prestigious goal for Europe’s most 
ambitious clubs.   
 
 
Figure 2-4 Top-13 European clubs by Enterprise value by January 1, 2019 (KPMG 
Sports Advisory Practice, 2019) 
 
2.1.5 Football and television 
A growing demand for televised football has led to a significant growth in income from 
broadcasting rights (fig.2-5) for the Premier League. From a domestic deal worth GBP 192 
million for the years 1992-97, the sum for the 2016-19 rights is GBP 5.136 million (Gazapo, 
n.d.). The growing trend is similar throughout Europe with the big five leagues (England, 
Germany, France, Italy and Spain) more than doubling their revenue from broadcasting rights 
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Fig 2-5 Premier League broadcasting rights 
 
Comparing broadcasting revenue with other big leagues, the English Premier League is in a 
league of its own. Figure 2-6 illustrates differences with revenues of almost two-fold per 
season and three-fold per match. Broadcasting companies pays the national league 
associations for rights to broadcast live matches and league content. The league associations 
then distribute the funds to the domestic clubs in accordance with agreed upon terms and 
conditions. 
 
       












1992-97 1997-01 2001-04 2004-07 2007-10 2010-13 2013-16 2016-19
Domestic and Overseas Broadcasting rights value 
£ million 1992-2019
Domestic Overseas
MANCHESTER UNITED 13 
2.2 Manchester United Football Club 
A 140-year long history of triumphs and tragedies has made the club into one of the world’s 
most iconic sports teams. It all started in Northern England. 
 
2.2.1 History 
The early years 
Manchester United was founded as Newton Heath Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway Football 
Club in 1878. Twenty-four years later in 1902 the club changed its name to Manchester 
United Football Club. The early years of the club were affected by economic hardships and 
varied success on the field (Manchester United, n.d.-a). After 30 years Manchester United 
won their first league title in 1908. This was the first of a total of 20 league champion 
trophies, with the last one captured in 2013. The total of 20 league titles makes Manchester 
United the most successful team in England, in terms of winning the national league 
championship, followed by Liverpool’s 18 and Arsenal’s 13 (Gough, 2019a).  
 
First half of the 20-th century was impacted by war and the team was struggling to stay in the 
top division (Manchester United, n.d.-a). The club hit a low point with the German bombing 
of their stadium Old Trafford in 1941. The main stand, dressing rooms and offices were 
destroyed and it was a devasting blow to the club. However, within a few years, and with the 
introduction of a man named Matt Busby, optimism would again be roaring at Old Trafford.  
 
Sir Matt Busby 1945-69 
As a previous Manchester City and Liverpool player, Busby was hired by Manchester United 
because of his leadership qualities. By combining young local talent with experienced players 
Busby set his marks on the club for 25 years. Busby’s team, known as “the Busby Babes”, 
established themselves among the top English teams winning several league and cup titles. 
After building one of the greatest English teams ever, Busby had to start all over again after 
another disaster hit the club. On February 6th, 1958, eight of the players were killed in a plane 
crash in Munich. The team and fans were yet again devastated. Busby himself, recovered 
from severe injuries and immediately started rebuilding another great title-winning team, 
culminating in winning United’s first European cup title in 1968. The year after, Busby retired 
and will always be remembered for his impact on the club. Some of the players he created, 
like Bobby Charlton, Dennis Law and George Best are still considered among the best British 
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players of all times. These players represented the style of football Busby promoted, 
entertaining the fans and keeping the crowd at the edge of their seats.  
 
Sir Alex Ferguson 1986-2013 
After Busby’s retirement, for an extended period, United were unable to win the league and 
only three FA cup titles saved the club from a disastrous period. Different managers struggled 
to make their impact, but that would change when the scot Alex Ferguson was hired 
November 1986. With thirteen Premier league titles (fig.2-7), five FA Cups and two UEFA 
Champions league titles, Ferguson is considered the most successful manager in English 
football’s history. Like Busby, Ferguson combined young local talent with experienced 
players. Another Busby similarity was Fergusons love for players that made the crowd 
buzzing and excited. Ryan Giggs, Eric Cantona and Cristiano Ronaldo are a few examples of 
players representing the typical Manchester United way of playing football. After Fergusons 
retirement in 2013, United have struggled to win titles and different managers have failed to 
make a long-term impact. Whether the hiring of previous player and manager apprentice of 




Figure 2-7 Manchester United league rank since start of the Premier League 
(Transfermarkt, n.d.-b). Ferguson’s last season was in 2013 (1). 
 
2.2.2 The business 
The Glazer acquisition  
From being a privately owned club, Manchester United Football Club went public on the 
London Stock Exchange in 1990. Fifteen years later in 2005 the club was acquired by the 
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York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in August 2012. Class A shares are sold to the public and 
Class B shares are held by the six Glazer siblings. The Class B shares have concentrated 
voting power counting for 10 votes per share, whereas Class A shares count for one vote per 
share. Through ownership of all Class B shares, the Glazers represent 97% of the total voting 
power of the capital stock. 
 
The Glazer takeover has met some controversy from the United fans, as the new owners have 
been accused of prioritizing financial results to sporting results. Being a debt-free club until 
2005, fans were worried the club would be paying off debt obligations instead of funding new 
players. Irregular protests from fans are still ongoing. A group of hardcore fans even started 
their own new Manchester United named FC United of Manchester. However, starting at the 
bottom of the 10-tier league system will be a long ladder to climb.  
 
Business structure  
Manchester United Plc, the Group, is a public limited company registered on Cayman Islands. 
It is a holding company, where its subsidiaries are wholly owned and operating in England, 
Wales, Ireland, Delaware (US) and the Cayman Islands. As a publicly traded company on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the corporation reports as a US domestic corporation and 
pays US federal income tax on the Group’s worldwide income. 
 
The Group operates as a single unit, in the form of a professional sports club. It is a single 
cash-generating business unit, even though revenue streams are divided into commercial, 
broadcasting and matchday segments. The commercial segment consists of sponsorship, retail 
merchandizing and licensing. Broadcasting revenue include domestic and international 
broadcasting contracts. Matchday revenue is basically the revenue from all games hosted at 
Old Trafford, including ticket sales, catering and other activities. For the fiscal year ending 
30th June 2019, the commercial part contributed to 44%, broadcasting 38% and matchday 
18% of total revenue (Manchester United, 2019).  
 
3 Strategic analysis 
A firm’s value is determined by its ability to earn a return on its capital in excess of the cost 
of capital (Healy, Palepu, & Peek, 2019, p. 46). Since the cost of capital is set by the capital 
markets, what determines the firm’s current and sustainable profit potential, is its own 
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strategic choices. A strategic analysis is a qualitative assessment of the firm’s business reality, 
on which, together with financial statement analysis, realistic future forecast is based on. In 
this chapter, section 3.1 is an industry analysis looking at the strategic choices the football 
industry is facing in regard to profitability. Section 3.2 is an analysis of the optimal 
competitive strategy for the firm to capture that profitability. Section 3.3 is a corporate 
strategy analysis on creating and exploiting synergies across the range of businesses 
Manchester United operates in. Lastly, section 3.4 looks at some of the business risks and 
industry risks Manchester United are exposed to. 
 
3.1 Industry analysis 
Strategy literature suggests that the average profitability of an industry is influenced by the 
“five forces”: Rivalry among the existing firms, Threat of new entrants, Threat of substitute 
products, Bargaining power of buyers and Bargaining power of suppliers (Healy et al., 2019, 
pp. 46-47).  
 
3.1.1 Rivalry among existing firms 
Rivalry is well-known to be fierce in the football industry. However, the competition appears 
more visibly on the sporting level than at the economic level. Nevertheless, Deloitte’s Money 
League Report (Deloitte, 2020),  rating the highest revenue-generating football clubs, 
indicates a strong connection between sporting and economic success. The top revenue-
generating clubs coincides with successful title-winning clubs such as Real Madrid, Barcelona 
and Manchester United. A winning team generates popularity and attracts supporters and 
sponsors. Higher prize money, more positive worldwide media exposure and better 
commercial deals are all effects of being successful on the pitch, explaining a strong 
connection between the sporting and the economic level. On that basis, a strong rivalry, 
driven by desire to reach success and glory, is present in the football industry. In spite of 
fierce competition, a distinct industry growth, especially revenue streams from broadcasting 
rights (Deloitte, 2017), reduce the rivals’ need to grab market shares from each other to foster 
own growth. 
 
Geographically, national league systems balance the competition. For Champions League and 
Europa League, a country and performance-based quota system secures participants to be 
spread fairly between the different countries.  
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3.1.2 Threat of new entrants 
With a fixed number of teams in each league, the threat of new entrants is somewhat rule 
based and constant. Even though the number of teams is sometimes adjusted domestically, the 
barrier to enter the industry is theoretically to promote from the second highest level. 
However, to become a title contender on both national and international level, is considered to 
be challenging. History shows its often the same teams in the likes of Real Madrid, Barcelona, 
Bayern München, Juventus and a few more, reappearing in the final stages of the Champions 
League, underlining difficulties of challenging the industry elite. 
 
For season 2017/18 the 20 highest revenue generating clubs in Europe were averaging 475 
million USD in revenues (Kidd, 2019), indicating a high entry barrier in the form of large 
economies of scale. The established clubs often have an iconic stadium, a well-established 
scouting network and modernized training facilities. These are elements new entries will need 
to obtain to compete, emphasizing the high entry barrier.  
 
When UEFA implemented their Financial fair play policy (UEFA, 2011) in 2010, the bar for 
new entries was raised a notch further. Clubs were no longer allowed to recklessly spend 
money to reach success. Several standards and laws were made to secure a more economic 
sustainable future for the football clubs. An important rule is the break-even rule (UEFA, 
2019a, p. 38), aiming to balance a club’s income and expenses. The break-even rule prevents 
clubs from buying its way to the top, as their income is required to match their costs within 
boundaries, protecting the established well driven clubs from new entries. 
 
3.1.3 Threat of substitute products 
Near substitutes would be other team sports like ice hockey, basketball and US sports like 
baseball and American football. More peripheral substitutes would be other sports and 
entertainment venues like athletics, concerts and movies. Assuming people’s preferences for 
entertainment to be constant, in regard to the spread between cultural and sporting events, 
non-sports substitutes will not be a considered a relevant threat to the industry.  
 
Threat from substitutes depends on relative price on substitute products and customers 
willingness to substitute, which again depends on the demand and popularity of the product. 
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Football’s status as the world’s biggest and most popular sport is uncontested (Nielsen Sports, 
2018). Even though football is popular there is no guarantee it will continue to engage the 
masses. However, with the last couple of decades’ seemingly growth in broadcasting rights 
and commercial revenues, there seems to be no serious signs of other sports overtaking 
football as the number one sports globally.  
 
A possible threat appearing with acceleration the last decade is the ongoing revolution of 
women’s football. The worldwide interest in women’s football are notably increasing (The 
Economist, 2019). This would normally be a potential threat. However, most of the big clubs 
in Europe have included the women’s team as part of the club, strategically disarming the 
threat.  
 
Not only competition from other sports must be considered as threats, but also the possibility 
of customers finding ways to get the product experience without benefits falling to the clubs. 
Examples are illegal streaming and falsified merchandize. Especially illegal streaming of 
matches seems to be a potential harming threat. A study by GumGum Sports (GumGum, 
2019) found that on average 7.1 million people were watching matches from illegal 
streaming, causing a potential loss of sponsorship revenue of £1million per match. Illegal 
streaming and sharing are well-known threats for the entertainment industry, and it will most 
likely continue to be a threat to the football industry, until clearer legislations and better 
surveillance mechanisms are in place. 
 
3.1.4 Bargaining power of buyers 
The power of the buyers is determined by price sensitivity and relative bargaining power 
(Healy et al., 2019, p. 50). The main product, a football match of 2x45 minutes, as a 
homogenous product would normally mean low switching cost for buyers. However, a 
football match contains more than just 11 vs 11 on a pitch for 90 minutes. Football fans are 
usually geographically and emotionally connected to their clubs, and their support for the club 
is often grounded in history and a sense of community. The fans’ geographical and emotional 
bond with the clubs increase their switching costs and reduce the price sensitivity, 
diminishing the fans’ relative bargaining power. In addition, the clubs seem to focus more on 
building and promoting their brand names, giving more prestige and value to their brand, 
leaving fans with less bargaining power.  
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Although it might look as if the fans are left with no bargaining power, this is not completely 
true. In particular one area, the clubs are aware of and try to avoid challenging the fans’ 
bargaining power. Matchday ticket prizes can be a tricky part. Even if the clubs often could 
have charged higher prices for match tickets due to high demand, the clubs seem to avoid 
becoming too greedy in this area. Throughout history football has been known as the sport of 
the working class. The games are a place where the hard workers can get a break from their 
often-struggling everyday life. If the prices get too high, the hardcore fans will not afford it 
and stadiums will be left with mostly tourists and wealthier people. This is likely to affect the 
atmosphere and induce a less passionate crowd with weaker bonds to the club, which again 
will affect the TV and overall experience. Therefore, clubs often distribute a large number of 
season tickets to members of the club, to benefit the loyalty of members and ensure a 
passionate crowd, instead of a stadium filled with selfie-absorbed tourists. As an example, 
52000 seats of Old Trafford’s 75000 seat capacity are reserved for season ticket holders 
(Manchester United, 2019). And to be eligible for a season ticket an official membership of 
Manchester United football club is required (Manchester United, n.d.-b), illustrating how a 
loyal fanbase are of importance to the business of a football club.  
 
3.1.5 Bargaining powers of suppliers 
Categorizing the football players and their agents as suppliers of services, the bargaining 
power naturally depends on the quality of the player and the negotiation skills of the agent-
player team. High media exposure and transparency facilitates assessing quality of the 
players. As the main actors of the industry, especially the most attractive players, have 
relatively high bargaining power resulting in high wages and transfer fees. Below is outlined a 
few topics affecting the bargaining powers of the players. 
 
The Bosman ruling 
When the European Union Court of Justice ruled in favour of Jean-Marc Bosman on the 15th 
December 1995 (Bogaert, 2013), football players were given more bargaining power. The 
ruling which prevented clubs to charge a transfer fee for players without a contract, has had a 
huge impact on players bargaining power since then. The players can now negotiate better 
contracts in light of being free to change clubs when the contract is expired. Also, as free 
players, they become more attractive as the acquiring clubs don’t have to pay a transfer fee. 
And when no transfer fee is involved, the player is positioned to negotiate better contracts. 
The Bosman ruling have played an important part of increasing the players bargaining power. 
MANCHESTER UNITED 20 
Social and digital media 
The last decade’s growth of digital media has enforced the clubs to increase their brand 
awareness. By increasing their brand awareness suppliers get more benefits from being 
associated with a popular brand, flipping the bargaining power in favor of the football clubs. 
The same goes for the players. By increasing their personal brand awareness in social media, 
players become more popular and gain bargaining power versus the club. A seemingly current 
trend is that fans, because of social media, become more connected to the players instead of 
the clubs. Some fans are now more likely to follow their favorite player no matter what club 
he plays for. This way the popular players with a large follower base, increase their overall 




An argument against the increasing bargaining power of the players, is a seemingly growth in 
the supply of players. With growing popularity and football being spread geographically, 
talented players come from all corners of the world. New markets emerge and a scouting 
network has become an important part of a football club. The accessibility to new 
undiscovered talent, enhances the clubs’ bargaining power, as the established players are 
facing risks of being replaced by new and less demanding talent. 
 
3.1.6 Summary of the industry analysis 
To sum up, a significant growth in the broadcasting and commercial sections, dampens 
profitability to be drowned by fierce rivalry. The growth gives the rivals enough cake to 
share. Large economies of scale make the entry barrier high. Large fan bases and established 
facilities built through decades of history enforces the difficulties to enter the industry. Illegal 
streaming is a threat and will be challenging to prevent. For how long fans will continue to 
pay a premium to watch football on TV is unknown. The recent growth will most likely 
diminish, but as by now and the nearest future, lucrative broadcasting deals indicates low 
bargaining power for the buying TV-viewer. Increased bargaining power to the players due to 
the growing individual player focus, increases costs and threatens the industry profitability. 
Overall, the industry growth and high entry barrier combined with threats from higher wages 
and illegal streaming, indicates modest threats from the five forces and a moderately high 
profit potential for the industry. 
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Threat Rivalry New entries Substitutes Buyers Suppliers
High
Moderate X X X
Low X X  
Table 3-1 Summary of industry analysis 
 
3.2 Competitive strategy analysis 
A firm’s profitability is limited to the profit potential within the industry framework. A way to 
work around this is to make strategic choices to change the industry structure. An example of 
this is when the teams of the English First division decided to create their own league and 
formed the Premier League in 1992. Manchester United was a forerunner in this process and 
it eventually enabled the Premier League to negotiate their own broadcasting deals resulting 
in better terms and higher profitability. An alternate approach is taking the industry 
framework for granted and rather focus its strategic choices on capturing the profitability 
offered within this framework. In the latter case, Healy et al. (2019, p. 53) states there are two 
generic competitive strategies in the forms of cost leadership and differentiation. Strategy 
literature suggests mixing the two strategies can harm profitability as the firm can be “stuck in 
the middle”, neither attracting the price-conscious customers nor providing adequate 
differentiation. 
 
3.2.1 Cost leadership or differentiation 
With a brief look at Manchester United and the football industry, cost leadership is excluded 
as United’s competitive strategy. The club’s main cost drivers are employee benefits and 
amortization. Aiming to lower costs on either of these seems counterproductive to running a 
successful sports club. Low wages will scare off good talent, and likewise buying low-priced 
players to reduce amortization is not resonating well with developing a trophy winning club. 
Unlike the commodity industry where cost leadership often is the main option to gain 
competitive advantage, the football industry is mostly driven by differentiation. Do they want 
to play football based on an attacking or defensive strategy? Do they rely on buying 
established players or developing their own through youth academies? These are just some of 
the strategic choices the club is facing.  
 
MANCHESTER UNITED 22 
3.2.2 Achieving and sustaining competitive advantage through differentiation 
Since Alex Ferguson’s retirement in 2013, Manchester United’s success on the pitch has been 
below expectations. Failing to win the English Premier League and the Champions League 
since then, is below par for a club with two Champions League and 13 Premier League titles 
under Ferguson’s 26 years as manager. The club even failed to qualify for the Champions 
League for two consecutive seasons in 2015 and 2016, resulting in reduced revenues. Still the 
club has remained one of the top-3 revenue generating clubs (Deloitte, 2019) with an average 
annual growth of 11% for the years 2014-2018 (Gough, 2019b). This suggests the club has 
some competitive advantage. Following below, I will look into some core competencies or 
key resources allowing Manchester United to achieve and sustain competitive advantage. 
 
Mission statement 
Manchester United’s differentiating strategy starts at the level of their mission statement. 
Rival Arsenal’s mission is to “make fans proud” (Arsenal, 2013), Juventus want to “provide 
enjoyment to their supporters by winning” (Juventus, n.d.) and Real Madrid want to “fulfil 
expectations of their members and supporters” (Real Madrid, n.d.). Manchester United’s 
proclaimed mission is “to be the best football club in the world both on and off the pitch” 
(Manchester United, 2018b). The off-pitch mission is rare in the football industry and can be 
interpreted as importance and priority to economic and commercial success alongside 
winning trophies. Another interpretation of off-pitch supremacy can be related to club image 
and behavior of club representatives off the pitch in public settings. However, United’s 
business strategy including expansion of brand, global community and marketing 
infrastructure (Manchester United, 2018c) reflects the commercial interpretation of the off-
pitch mission statement. 
 
Brand name and business strategy 
In their business strategy, Manchester United state they want to expand their brand, global 
community and marketing infrastructure. They do this actively and visibly by emerging into 
new markets by placing their pre-season preparation to different parts of the world. USA, 
Kina, Japan and Australia are all commercially potent areas that have seen visits from United 
in recent past. Especially China, has been an expansion target and according to Brand 
Finance, Manchester United is the most popular foreign team in China (Brand Finance, n.d.). 
This is likely a consequence from United’s strong presence in Chinese social media, which is 
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another strategy the club uses to expand their global community. United aim to make an 
impact on social media, by communicating with global fans on a daily basis. 
 
Kantar Media, a global market research company, conducted in 2012 and 2019 surveys 
revealing Manchester United had a worldwide fan/follower base of 1.1 billion in 2019, an 
increase from 659 million in 2012 (Manchester United, 2019a). This survey not only reveals 
the club has a huge fanbase, but also shows how their strategy is to exploit their brand name. 
A documented fanbase of 1.1 billion is useful support when dealing with potential 
sponsorship and commercial deals. Though this kind of survey is likely to contain errors and 
biases, it does give a brief view of Manchester United’s worldwide popularity, on which they 
purposefully work to capitalize on. No other teams in the industry are known to have 
conducted a comparable survey of this level, underlining the differential level of United’s 
competitive strategy in regard to exploiting their brand. 
 
Old Trafford stadium 
Manchester United’s iconic stadium, Old Trafford, is the club’s most valuable asset. A nearly 
fully utilized crowd capacity of 75000 is 15000 more than their English rivals (Transfermarkt, 
n.d.-c) and opens up for a unique fan experience. The attendance supremacy adds to a 
competitive advantage through a higher matchday revenue potential.  
 
The footballing staff 
The people responsible for providing success and glory on the pitch is mainly the players, the 
coaching staff and other key personnel like medical and analytical experts. A possible 
indicator of competitive advantage is the sporting results. Success on the pitch naturally 
increases revenue. The mediocre results since Ferguson’s retirement in 2013, suggest a 
competitive disadvantage. However, it should be considered that the frequent manager 
changes, with Ole Gunnar Solskjær being the fifth manager in six years, left the club with a 
varied mix of players and impacts from different managers. Since Solskjær was hired, the 
club has on numerous occasions stated in media it wants to reorganize and rebuild a new 
team, and that it will take 2-3 years. The new club philosophy, influenced by Ferguson’s era, 
includes an attacking and entertaining style of football, devoted players willing to put the club 
ahead of themselves and an extended belief in and use of talented homegrown youth players. 
The rebuilding might result in a short term disadvantage, but the changes can also fuel a 
future successful team. By having a clear sporting strategy and way of playing football, 
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everyone involved can work with the same things in training and towards the same goals. 
Successful examples of this strategy are Barcelona and Ajax, who both begin implementing 
their football strategy at a young age. Another advantage by having a clear club philosophy is 
that it facilitates the job for the scouting network. They know they are looking for passionate 
attack-minded players, which facilitates a refined and effective search. 
 
Organization 
Head of sporting matters, including player transfers, and Executive vice-chairman of 
Manchester United since 2012, Ed Woodward, has taken a lot of critics since his appointment. 
As a previous businessman and banker, Woodward has been accused of failing in the transfer 
market due to his lack of sports and industry knowledge. He is also held accountable for the 
failed manager hirings. In spite of the critics, Woodward is still head of the club’s sporting 
matters. Surely, fans have been disappointed with the club’s ability to attract desired top 
players, but evidently the club has harvested from Woodward’s background as a businessman. 
Growing revenues in spite of mediocre results indicate some organizational advantage at the 
club. A recent example of the club’s ability to attract lucrative commercial deals is their 
partnership with Chinese online giant Alibaba, granting access to 700 million consumers 
across Alibaba’s digital platforms (Manchester United, 2019c). After all, it looks like having a 
businessman leading a sports club pays off, off the pitch. 
 
3.2.3 Summary of competitive advantage analysis 
The combination of poor results on the pitch and increased revenues, indicates a competitive 
advantage for Manchester United. The club’s differentiating mission and business strategy 
reveals they want to capitalize on their popularity and fully exploit the commercial potential 
of their brand. The brand awareness and openly eager approach to pursue economic success 
alongside sporting success is rare in the football industry and have positioned the club to 
continue increasing revenues and sustaining competitive advantage.  
 
3.3 Corporate strategy analysis 
Differing from the competitive strategy analysis, which is on the individual business level, a 
corporate strategy analysis looks at “positive and negative consequences of managing 
different business under one corporate umbrella” (Healy et al, 2019, p. 57). Since Manchester 
United operate and manage their business of running a professional football club as a single 
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reporting segment, a corporate strategy analysis is of less importance for the strategy analysis 
in this thesis. Still there are some synergies worth mentioning as sources of possible value 
creation at corporate level. 
 
Asset sharing 
The Old Trafford stadium is housing guided tours and a museum with the long and rich 
history of the club on display. Owning their own stadium allows the club to create synergies 
from different usage of the stadium and also strengthens bond with the supporters. Other 
potential synergies at corporate level are the inclusion of the women’s team, allowing better 
utilization of the training facilities, organizational structure and other necessary resources to 
run a professional football club. By including a women’s team, the club positions itself to 
capitalize on another potential growth area.  
 
The Manchester United group consists of several subsidiaries such as Manchester United 
Merchandizing, Manchester United Catering and Manchester United TV. All subsidiaries are 
wholly owned by the group and they benefit from being under the Manchester United brand 
umbrella. On the other hand, an arguable question is whether the corporation could take 
advantage of the brand popularity by entering new businesses. However, that strategy run the 
risk of diluting the strength of the brand. 
 
3.4 Risks related to the industry and the business 
Numerous risk factors are affecting the football industry and the business of Manchester 
United. Some of them, such as illegal streaming and increased player wages, are mentioned in 
the previous sections. While some of these factors are within the club’s control, and can be 
acted upon accordingly, some are outside of their control and will “influence future estimates 
and forward-looking statements” (Manchester United, 2018a, p. ii).  
 
3.4.1 Risks related to the industry 
3.4.1.1 Broadcasting rights 
Broadcasting contracts have made up for about one third of Manchester United’s total 
revenue since 2014 (Manchester United, 2018a, p. 1). The club recognizes broadcasting and 
media contracts may change and affect future revenue streams. Contracts with the 
broadcasting industry are negotiated by Premier League and UEFA, leaving the individual 
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clubs side-lined without much power to influence the broadcasting contracts. On a worldwide 
level, it is uncertain for how long the average viewer will continue to pay a premium to watch 
football on TV. Illegal streaming is already a well-known problem in the industry. In addition, 
big actors like Facebook and YouTube are entering the live broadcasting segment and could 
possibly challenge the existing model of protected broadcasting rights. 
 
3.4.1.2 Laws and regulations 
With United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, known as “Brexit”, there is 
uncertainty in various areas affecting the football industry. The biggest uncertainty may be the 
uncertainty itself. Nobody can really predict the specific consequences Brexit will have for 
the Premier League. It is currently work in progress waiting for the government’s handling of 
the Brexit.  
 
Financial elements such as asset valuation, interest rates and credit rating could see changes 
and increased volatility, but probably the most notable impact is the withdrawal of the basic 
principle of “free movement of workers”. According to BBC, more than 100 players in the 
Premier League would be affected (Slater, 2016). Brexit means the players from the EU will 
be treated as non-EU players, meaning they would need a work permit to be eligible for 
playing in the Premier League. The acceptance of a work permit depends on conditions such 
as number of games played for their national team. This will lead to fewer EU-players in the 
Premier League. On the flipside, Brexit make more room for British talents to make their 
appearance, which could make a positive long run impact on British football. Overall, the fact 
that all 20 Premier League clubs voted against Brexit (Yeung, 2016), indicate Brexit is not 
favorable for English football clubs. 
 
Other changes in laws and regulations can change the circumstances for the football industry. 
Being governed by Premier League, FA, UEFA and FIFA, Premier League clubs are 
constantly subject to laws and regulations outside of their control. An example is the “Home 
grown player rule”, requiring clubs to include at least eight homegrown players in their squad 
(UEFA, 2019b). UEFA defines a homegrown player as a player who has been trained 
minimum 3 years between the age of 15-21 in the relevant country. This type of rules will 
affect the clubs’ the ability to freely choose the composition of their squad. Another example 
is ongoing rumors about a European Super league, exclusively for the biggest clubs in Europe 
(Goal, 2018). Such great upheaval of the existing tournament formats could possibly make 
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dramatic impacts on the industry, and the consequences of being left out could severely affect 
the second-tier clubs falling short of qualification. 
 
3.4.1.3 Other factors 
A global recession can generally harm the industry. An economic downturn could possibly 
affect most revenue streams. Though, the last global recession a decade ago, did not affect the 
football industry remarkably, which can be written on the account of the underlying growth in 
the industry. Increased terror activity, especially against sports targets, could affect matchday 
sales negatively and scare people off, hence reducing football’s popularity. A natural disaster 
or a pandemic virus outbreak shutting down large parts of society, are a possible threats that 
could harm the industry severely, depending on the scale and duration of the incident.  
 
3.4.2 Risks related to the business 
3.4.2.1 Brand and reputation 
Manchester United states that “The success of our business depends on the value and strength 
of our brand and reputation” (Manchester United, 2018a, p. 4). A natural connector to the 
club’s brand and reputation is the first team’s performance. A successful team will generate 
more interest and strengthen the brand, whereas the opposite will weaken the brand. 
Therefore, any risks of affecting the first team performance negatively must be taken into 
consideration by the club. Injuries for key players, poor management and a collective decline 
of form are risks the club is facing, which can affect the brand and reputation. 
 
3.4.2.2 Financial factors 
Indebtedness 
Since the Glazer takeover in 2005 the club has carried significant amounts of debt. This was 
the first time since 1931 the club had carried any debt (Investopedia, 2020). The club states 
the indebtedness may “affect our financial health and competitive position” (Manchester 
United, 2018a, p. 16). The club acknowledges the risk of carrying debt as interest payments 
and repayments can limit their financial flexibility. To compare, privately owned rivals like 
Manchester City and Paris St. Germain, carries no debt, giving them more financial flexibility 
in areas such as player transfers and player wages.  
 
 
MANCHESTER UNITED 28 
Interest and exchange rates fluctuations 
Manchester United, from their indebtedness, is exposed to risk from interest rate changes. 
Approximately two thirds of their borrowings have a fixed coupon rate (Manchester United, 
2018a, p. F44), and the remaining third has variable interest rates. Interest rate risk is 
managed by interest rate swaps where the club finds it appropriate. For the years 2016-18, 
about 7% of total yearly revenue is generated in Euros and slightly above 20% in USD 
(Manchester United, 2018a, p. 12). Risk from exchange rate fluctuations is mainly hedged by 
using future and forward contracts.  
 
Tax legislation 
As a Cayman Islands registered company, operating in the United Kingdom and listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange, the firm faces a complex tax regime. There is always the risk of 
tax rate changes affecting the club. However, this goes both ways and in the long run not 
expected to affect profitability, apart from extra resources required to optimize tax strategy. 
 
3.4.2.3 Ownership 
United, as any other club, always carries the risk of changing owners. In spite of no official 
statement from the Glazers about wanting to sell the club, it is evident they are businesspeople 
and are likely to sell if the price is right. There have been ongoing rumors in media about 
interested buyers from Saudi Arabia (Hutchinson, 2019). However, just being rumors, it will 
not affect forthcoming analysis. 
 
3.4.2.4 Risks of failing to comply with national and international laws and regulations 
If breaking UEFA financial fair play requirements or other severe infringements, 
consequences could be devastating. Relatively recent examples are Juventus and Rangers. 
Juventus were convicted of corruption in 2006. The club was relegated to Serie B in addition 
to being stripped of their two previous league titles (Hafez, 2019). For Rangers it was even 
worse. In 2012 the club was liquidated due to unpaid taxes and failure to comply with 
national accounting regulations (Weir, 2012). The club was kicked out of the league system 
and had to restart at the 4th tier at the bottom of the league system. Though, both clubs have 
managed to recover, financial consequences of non-compliance with laws and regulations can 
be critical. 
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4 Financial statement analysis 
4.1 Framework for financial statement analysis 
The next three chapters will focus on financial statement analysis and create a foundation for 
forecasting future financial statements. In chapter 4 the choice of time frame and comparable 
peers is made, before presenting Manchester United’s Income statement and Balance sheet as 
disclosed in their financial statements for the analysis period 2014-2019. First part of the 
financial statement analysis in chapter 5 is an accounting analysis. The purpose of an 
accounting analysis is to evaluate whether the accounting reflect the underlying business 
reality. In this section I highlight key accounting policies and estimates. To mitigate the 
impact of possible distortions on financial analysis in the second part, I make several 
adjustments of various accounting items. Among the adjusted items are gains/losses on 
disposals of assets, currency exchange and deferred tax. The financial analysis in chapter 6 
consists of a ratio analysis, analyzing profitability, leverage and growth ratios, in addition to a 
cash flow analysis. The financial statement analysis will add to the strategic analysis in 
chapter 3 and serve as basis for the prospective analysis in chapter 7 and 8. 
 
4.1.1 Time frame 
The time frame of the analysis is the period of which historical financial statements are 
included. The length of the period depends on various factors, such as the stability of the 
industry and where the firm is in its growth cycle. For instance, a volatile and cyclic industry 
such as the steel industry, will normally require a longer time frame to ensure capturing 
trends. The football industry has been, as previously described in chapter 2, a continuously 
growing industry. From figure 2-2 we notice that not even the worldwide recession 2008-09 
made a noteworthy impact on the top clubs’ revenue. The industry’s apparent short-term 
immunity to a macroeconomic factor such as a worldwide recession, indicates a stable non-
cyclic industry and a shorter analysis time frame is suggested. In addition, strong growth and 
industry changes regarding digital media and broadcasting rights, indicates a shorter time 
frame, as historical and current situation is less likely to give an accurate prediction of the 
future financial performance. To sum up, the non-cyclic nature, together with the growth and 
changes in the football industry, supports a choice of a relatively short time frame. On that 
basis, the choice of six years is made. In this thesis the fiscal years of 2014-2019 will be 
included. Each fiscal year end on June 30th.  
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4.1.2 Comparable peers 
To evaluate the results from the analysis, a basis for comparison can be useful. For the 
comparable clubs to serve as good comparison basis, they need to be exposed to the same 
market and economic conditions and have approximately similar size and risk level. On that 
ground, Arsenal is chosen as main comparable peer. Arsenal, like Manchester United, own 
their own relatively large stadium, come under the same English legislations, and recently 
parted ways with a long serving successful manager in Arsene Wenger. Wenger, like 
Ferguson, kept his club fighting at the top for more than two decades winning several titles. 
And similar to United, Arsenal have struggled to keep the same competitive level after the 
loss of their high profiled manager.  
 
As a comparable peer group, Real Madrid and Juventus is added to Arsenal. While Real 
Madrid is owned by the club members, Juventus and Arsenal, are publicly owned and traded 
on the stock market. The reason behind the choice of Real Madrid and Juventus is to include 
successful clubs from “big five” countries. The considered “big five” countries include 
England, Spain, Italy, Germany and France. Arguably, Paris SG and Bayern München could 
be comparable peers as well, but they are left out together with city rival Manchester City 
mainly because of their different ownership structure. As mentioned in chapter 3, clubs with 
private owners like Paris SG and Manchester City are not debt financed and hence compete 
under different conditions and is therefore left out of the peer group. 
 
4.2 Manchester United Income statement and Balance sheet 2014-2019 
4.2.1 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
As the European clubs’ governing body, UEFA presents prescriptive accounting guidelines in 
their “Club and Financial fair play” report (UEFA, 2019a). UEFA allows the clubs to issue 
and apply own accounting policies as long as they are in accordance with national and 
international accounting regulations. As a foreign company listed on the NYSE, Manchester 
United have the option to report by IFRS as issued by the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) or the US General accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Historically United 
have reported in compliance with IFRS and its predecessor International Accounting 
Standards (IAS), and a change to GAAP is likely to require extra resources and would change 
the conditions for this analysis. It is therefore assumed the club will continue reporting under 
IFRS.  
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4.2.2 Income statement 
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Revenue 433 164  395 178  515 345  581 204  590 022  627 122  
Operating expenses 372 240-  387 179-  436 709-  511 315-  564 006-  602 936-  
Net disposal player reg. 6 991     23 649   9 786-     10 926   18 119   25 799   
Operating profit 67 915   31 648   68 850   80 815   44 135   49 985   
Finance costs 27 668-   35 419-   20 459-   25 013-   24 233-   25 470-   
Finance income 256        204        442        736        6 195     2 961     
Net finance cost 27 412-   35 215-   20 017-   24 277-   18 038-   22 509-   
Profit before tax 40 503   3 567-     48 833   56 538   26 097   27 476   
Tax 16 668-   2 672     12 462-   17 361-   63 367-   8 595-     
Profit 23 835   895-        36 371   39 177   37 270-   18 881   
Inome statement Manchester United £ '000
 
4.2.3 Balance sheet 
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Goodwill 421 453   421 453   421 453   421 453   421 453   421 453   
Property, plant and equipment 254 859   250 626   245 714   244 738   245 401   246 032   
Intangible assets 204 572   238 944   244 181   296 091   378 187   347 404   
Trade and other receivables 41           3 836       11 223     15 399     4 724       9 889       
Investment property 13 671     13 559     13 447     13 966     13 836     24 979     
Deferred tax 129 631   133 640   145 460   142 107   63 974     58 415     
Derivative financial instruments - - 3 760       1 666       4 807       30           
Non-current assets 1 024 227 1 062 058 1 085 238 1 135 420 1 132 382 1 108 202 
Inventories - - 926         1 637       1 416       2 130       
Trade and other receivables 125 119   83 627     128 657   103 732   168 060   77 601     
Tax receivable - 124         - - 1 347       643         
Derivative financial instruments - 27           7 888       3 218       1 159       312         
Cash and cash equivalents 66 365     155 752   229 194   290 267   242 022   307 637   
Current assets 191 484   239 530   366 665   398 854   414 004   388 323   
Total assets 1 215 711 1 301 588 1 451 903 1 534 274 1 546 386 1 496 525 
Share capital 52           52           52           52           52           53           
Share premium 68 822     68 822     68 822     68 822     68 822     68 822     
Merger reserve 249 030   249 030   249 030   249 030   249 030   249 030   
Hedging reserve 25 918     4 729       32 989-     31 724-     27 738-     35 544-     
Retained earnings 154 828   155 285   173 367   191 436   135 099   132 841   
Total equity 498 650   477 918   458 282   477 616   425 265   415 202   
Trade and other payables 42 464     48 078     41 450     83 587     104 271   79 183     
Deferred revenue 15 631     21 583     38 899     39 648     37 085     33 354     
Deferred tax liabilities 28 837     17 311     14 364     20 828     28 559     31 865     
Derivative financial instruments - 2 769       10 637     655         - 2 298       
Borrowings 326 803   410 482   484 528   497 630   486 694   505 779   
Non-current liabilities 413 735   500 223   589 878   642 348   656 609   652 479   
Tax liabilities 2 999       2 105       6 867       9 772       3 874       2 859       
Trade and other payables 102 232   131 283   199 668   190 315   267 996   230 386   
Deferred revenue 180 613   186 608   188 844   207 245   183 567   190 146   
Derivative financial instruments 2 477       2 966       2 800       1 253       - -
Borrowings 15 005     485         5 564       5 724       9 074       5 453       
Current liabilities 303 326   323 447   403 743   414 309   464 511   428 844   
Total liabilities 717 061   823 670   993 621   1 056 657 1 121 120 1 081 323 
Equity and liabilities 1 215 711 1 301 588 1 451 903 1 534 273 1 546 385 1 496 525 
Manchester United Balance sheet  £ '000
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5 Accounting analysis 
The purpose of an accounting analysis is to “assess the degree of distortion in a firm’s 
accounting numbers” (Healy et al., 2019, p. 78). By detecting and adjusting accounting 
distortions the financial analysis will be more reliable and creating a more realistic basis for 
future forecasting. In this chapter I look into management’s incentives to “misreport”, key 
areas of possible distortions and lastly a reformulated and adjusted income statement and 
balance sheet is presented. 
 
5.1 Incentives for accounting distortions 
The financial statement is based on a significant amount of subjectivity and the use of 
estimates. This opens up for management to influence the numbers. To get a better 
understanding of which areas possible distortions may appear in, it can help to understand 
which incentives management has to influence the accounting. Like most companies, it is 
assumed Manchester United want to lower taxes and increase profits. High profitability is 
likely to attract sponsors and commercial partners in the prospects of possessing financial 
power to invest in high profiled players to fuel sporting success and popularity. A strong 
financial position would also facilitate negotiating better debt terms. In addition, tax savings, 
management bonuses and debt covenants are areas for possible accounting noise. An example 
is Manchester United’s revolving facility, giving the club instant credit access to £125 
million. This revolving facility includes a financial maintenance covenant requiring the club 
to maintain an EBITDA of minimum £65 million (Manchester United, 2019, p. note23). If the 
club should get close to that amount, incentives would increase for management to “adjust” 
EBITDA drivers.  
 
5.2 Key accounting policies and critical estimates 
By identifying key accounting policies and critical estimates an analyst can get a better 
understanding of areas and specific accounting matters where actual numbers can deviate 
significantly from prospected numbers. Below follows an outlining and discussion of some of 
Manchester United’s significant accounting policies. 
 
5.2.1 Player registrations (intangible assets) 
The players, forming the football team, is the most important aspect of a football club. 
Without the team, other parts of the club would not have a reason to exist. Considering the 
MANCHESTER UNITED 33 
importance of the players, the recognition of player registrations could be worth looking into. 
A player registration is defined as a contract that gives the club the right to use the player’s 
services. When a club buys a player, it does not own the player, but rather the right to use the 
player for the purpose of contributing to the cash generating unit, the football club. In this 
respect, the right to use the player, derived from the contract, player registrations are 
recognized as intangible assets in accordance with IAS 38. The asset recognition and 
capitalization of the players’ contracts appear as important aspects of intangible assets and 
warrants a closer look into. 
 
5.2.1.1 Capitalization or expense 
Player registrations can according to UEFA (2019a, p. 69) be treated as “capitalization and 
amortization” or “income and expense”. The industry norm is the method of capitalization 
and amortization (UEFA, 2011, p. 92). For football clubs, capitalization is likely to inflate 
assets and increase profitability ratios early on, in opposition to expensing, which keeps asset 
base lower and decrease short term profitability ratios. Expensing might also make it difficult 
to assess the success of the business model as operating profit measures will be skewed. 
Considering the large amounts involved in the football transfer market, expensing would 
cause extreme fluctuations into an already highly varying industry profitability, possibly 
explaining why most clubs prefer the capitalization method.  
 
5.2.1.2 Valuation of player registrations 
In line with IAS 38, book value of Manchester United’s player registrations 2019 is cost less 
accumulated amortizations totaling £340 million. The player registrations are required to be 
amortized for the contract period. When contracts are renewed before expiration, remaining 
book value will be amortized for the length of the existing contract added the new extension.  
Is the book value of £340 million reflecting “true and fair” value of the Manchester United 
squad? Academic literature on this subject suggests otherwise. In a study about impairment 
tests for football players, Maglio and Rey (2017) points out three areas where book value of 
football players possibly can defer from fair value. The valuation of homegrown players, the 
acquisition of “free agents” and the process of impairment tests are all worth looking into 
when estimating the value of footballers.  
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Youth academy and homegrown players 
The definition of a homegrown player is “a player who, regardless of nationality, have been 
trained by their club or by another club in the same national association for at least three years 
between the age of 15 and 21” (UEFA, 2019b). Since IAS 38 forbids capitalization of costs 
for internally generated intangible assets, homegrown players acquired from their own youth 
academy carry the book value of zero. Scholars argue this is wrong. Kulikova and Goshunova 
(2014, pp. 47-48) argue that investments in youth players represent an asset, as they are 
developed through systematic training and are able create future economic benefits to the club 
as part of the club’s squad and cash generating unit. In the same line, Maglio and Rey (2017, 
p. 3) state that the cost of a youth academy can be compared to research and development 
because they have long-term rewards. An example of misfit between book value and fair 
value is six-time FIFA player of the year winner Lionel Messi. Messi, as a homegrown player, 
carries the book value of zero. Unofficial market value is according to Transfermarkt (n.d.-d) 
€150 million. Obviously, he has contributed to FC Barcelona’s inflow of economic benefits 
and illustrates challenges of valuating player registrations. 
 
Acquisition of free agents 
A player without an existing contract, is considered a free agent (Bosman-player), and a 
transfer fee is not required to acquire the right to use the player’s services. With no transfer 
fee, acquisition cost will be zero, except from some agency and other transaction costs. As 
discussed in chapter 3, the lack of transfer fee increases the bargaining power of free agents. 
An example is United’s acquisition of Chilean striker Alexis Sanchez in January 2018. As a 
free agent, Sanchez negotiated his way to become the highest paid player in the history of 
Premier League (Voakes, 2018). Since there is no credible ground for valuation, instead of 
being capitalized as an asset, he affects the income statement directly through higher 
employee benefits cost. A club wanting to acquire Sanchez would need to consider his huge 
salary as part of the cost, and it would naturally lower potential transfer fees. Possibly, to 
lower employee benefits cost, United could actually want to pay a transfer fee to rid of 
Sanchez, illustrating a complicated valuation matter.  
 
Impairment tests of footballers 
Maglio and Rey (2017) concludes that football clubs’ financial information about impairment 
tests is inadequate. Only a few of the clubs in their sample revealed any information about 
impairment tests in the notes of their financial statements. Maglio and Rey suggest 
MANCHESTER UNITED 35 
impairment tests to be performed by an external part, which could lead to more frequent 
impairment adjustments. However, evaluation basis such as poor form, is not an adequate 
impairment indicator since a single player is not a cash generating unit (Deloitte, n.d.). This is 
where a functional transfer market can be useful. The market value already reflects the 
player’s form and development, and it is arguably an indicator for a player’s true value. 
 
5.1.2.3 Book value vs Market value of squad 
Comparing book value with average market value estimates from Transfermarkt (n.d.-e) and 
KPMG (2018), reveals that the squad of seven European top clubs, market value is on average 
nearly double the book value. 
 
Comparison of book value and market value 2018 (€ million)
Man U Real M Barcelona Man C Arsenal Liverpool Juventus
Est. market value 694      788      865      922      563      522      552      
Book value 417      316      442      551      269      308      331      
Difference € mill. 277      472      423      371      294      213      221      
Difference % 66       149      96       67       109      69       67       
Average diff. % 89        
Table 5-1 Squad value 
 
The possible undervaluation of intangible assets may have analytical implications. It may 
inflate rates of return on capital, implicating long term performance forecast. Healy et al. 
(2019, p. 129) suggests a way to deal with this is leave the book values as they are and keep in 
mind the underlying bias when forecasting. It also risks inflating operational profit measures 
when undervalued players are sold, as profit from sales affects the income statement directly. 
The valuation of the player registrations is a complex matter that preferably could have been 
discussed more. However, within the limited scope of this thesis, the biased valuation of the 
player registrations is acknowledged and kept in consideration for the prospective analysis in 
chapter 7 and 8. 
 
5.2.3 Goodwill (Intangible assets) 
Goodwill of £421 million, originating from the Glazer acquisition in 2005 (Manchester 
United, 2019, p. note 15), is not subject to depreciation, but is tested yearly for impairment as 
required by IAS 36. When book value is higher than recoverable amount, based on value-in-
use calculations, an impairment loss is recognized. Value-in-use calculations contain various 
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assumptions for forecasting values including discount rate for cash flows and first team 
performance. This is a complex process and illustrates the importance and frequent use of 
managements own policies and estimates. A question arising is whether the origin of the 
goodwill was a result from undervaluation of the club’s assets back in 2005. By undervaluing 
assets, and recognizing goodwill instead, future depreciation is reduced, since goodwill is not 
subject to depreciation. If other assets are undervalued and goodwill inflated, it will inflate 
profitability measures and affect future forecasting. 
 
5.2.4 Property, plant and equipment (PPE) 
Property, plant and equipment comprises mainly of the Old Trafford stadium and the AON 
training complex. Of other assets for 2019 fixtures and fittings made up for 10% and plant 
and machinery for 2% of total value of the asset group (Manchester United, 2019). 
Recognition of PPE is made in accordance with IAS 16. The club use the cost model and 
book value for 2019 is £216 million, which is cost less accumulated depreciation.  
 
Whenever circumstances change indicating a possible impairment, tests are conducted to see 
if the asset is eligible for an impairment. Non-current assets, including PPE, are subject to 
impairment when book value exceeds recoverable amount, with the recoverable amount being 
the highest of fair value and value in use. Fair value of Old Trafford and AON training 
complex is difficult to estimate since there is no official market for such assets. Equally 
challenging it can be to estimate value in use. Both the stadium and the training complex is 
part of the whole of Manchester United’s single cash generating unit. To estimate its future 
cash flow individually demands critical estimates of the management and is likely to include 
an unknown amount of uncertainty.  
 
5.2.4 Revenue recognition 
Changing from IAS 18, the club implemented IFRS 15 “Revenue from contracts with 
customers” at the start of fiscal year 2019. The main effect of switching to IFRS 15 is 
commercial contracts are recognized earlier. This implementation has impacted their financial 
statements, and prior years including 2015 have been restated (Manchester United, 2019). 
Normally, this would affect this financial statement analysis, as the numbers used are 
collected from the yearly reports. However, the minor adjustments are considered 
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insignificant for this analysis, and therefore original numbers as disclosed in the yearly 
statements will remain.  
 
Manchester United’s revenue streams are divided into three sections consisting of 
commercial, broadcasting and matchday revenues. 
 
Commercial revenue 
The commercial part includes sponsorship, retailing and licensing of Manchester United 
branded merchandise. For some contingent sponsorship agreements, the accounting 
management’s critical judgement comes into consideration. For example, their current most 
valuable sponsorship contract, a 10-year Adidas deal worth £750 million, is subject to 
adjustments depending on first team performance. The payments may increase if winning 
titles, but also decrease if failing to qualify for the Champions League. In this case, if failing 
to qualify for the Champions League for two consecutive seasons, yearly payments will be 
reduced by 30%, until passing the threshold of qualifying again. This is an example of how 
critical the management’s estimates can be. If failing to qualify for the Champions League for 
two or more consecutive seasons, sponsorship payments diminish and affect future cashflow 
and value-in-use calculations. And not only will sponsorship revenue decrease, but as seen 
below also broadcasting revenue will be reduced. Failing to qualify for the Champions 
League is likely to have a significant impact on revenues and affect a prospective analysis. 
 
Broadcasting revenue 
Broadcasting revenue is received from broadcasting contracts with Premier League (60%) and 
UEFA (35%) (Manchester United, 2019, p. 5). Both Premier League and UEFA operates on 
three-year contract cycles with the broadcasting corporations. This affects the revenue growth 
analysis in the forecast chapter, as broadcasting revenue receive a bump every third year 
when new and more valuable contracts are signed.  
 
Common for both UEFA and Premier League broadcasting contracts are the part contingency, 
as it consists of a fixed sum and a sum based on performance. Of the 150 million Manchester 
United earned from participating in the Premier League in 2018, £ 37 was performance based 
(Premier League, 2018). That is £ 35 million more than the last placed club, West Bromwich 
Albion, who only received £2 million. Though, it is unlikely Manchester United will go from 
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second to last place in the Premier League, the difference in achievement-based broadcasting 
payments, underlines the importance of estimates and how it can affect a prospective analysis.  
 
Matchday revenue 
Matchday revenue includes revenue from their home game activities, such as ticket sales and 
catering. Revenue from season tickets paid in advance is recognized as deferred revenue and 
released as revenue as matches are played. The number of matches can vary every year and 
depends on the first team performance. In 2015, when the club was absent from European 
competitions, the number of home games was 21. The 2017 season, culminating with the 
Europa League victory, was the most successful with 31 home matches. 
 
From the above sections, it appears the club’s revenue streams are connected to the team’s 
performance. Better performance and winning titles lead to more popularity, increased 
attractiveness for sponsors and higher prize money from UEFA and Premier League. A 
successful team will attract better players and key staff, which again will lay a better 
foundation for even more success both on and off the pitch. Main concern about revenues and 
accounting policies is estimating future revenues and cashflows based on team performance. 
Since this is a financial statement analysis and not a sporting analysis, team performance 
predictions will not be explored.  
 
5.2.5 Foreign currency 
Being a United Kingdom based company, Manchester United’s functional and reporting 
currency is pound sterling, hence all foreign currency transactions are translated into pound 
sterling for the purpose of presentation and reporting. The company is exposed to Euro 
through broadcasting revenue from participation in European tournaments, and through 
occasional transfer agreements with other clubs which are payable in euro. Exposure to USD 
comes mainly from sponsor revenue and US debt securities. Currency exchange rate of the 
transaction day or year-end rate when revaluating is used.  
 
Foreign exchange gains or losses are recognized in the associated part of the income 
statement, which means exchange amounts from financial instruments is recognized in net 
financial costs and amounts from operational activities like player transfers, broadcasting and 
sponsorship, is recognized in operational costs. Peers Arsenal, Juventus and Real Madrid have 
similar policies regarding foreign currency exchange. All peers, according to their financial 
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statements, recognize currency exchange gains or losses in their income statement. Lack of 
detailed information in the statements, makes it difficult to make nuanced policy comparisons. 
Without exact numbers, it is assumed Manchester United in general is exposed to more 
currency risk than their peers. Involvement in US denoted financial instruments, foreign 
denoted prize pools and broadcasting revenue, and a prioritized strategy of international 
expansion supports the assumption and is taken into consideration for the prospective analysis 
in chapter 7 and 8.  
 
Since the beginning of the analysis period, the pound sterling GBP has weakened 4.5% 
against Euro and 17% against the US dollar (Pound Sterling Live, n.d.). A weakened pound 
increase value of debt as it is carried in US dollar, and the currency fluctuation influence debt-
to-capital ratios.  
 
5.2.6 Current and deferred tax 
Manchester United, a Cayman Islands registered company, reporting as a US domestic 
corporation and with its principal subsidiaries operating in the UK, make ground for 
complicated taxation matters. Ideally, the corporation would through creative tax planning, 
shift profits to tax haven Cayman Islands and debt to high tax country US to maximize tax 
debt shield and overall profit. However, as a US domestic corporation listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange, they are subject to US federal tax on their worldwide income, and the 
transparency and strict requirements following being a publicly traded company diminish the 
opportunities for creative tax planning. The US connection differs from other clubs in the 
industry and is likely to demand extra resources dealing with the complex taxation matters.  
 
A tax treaty between US and UK liberates the club from double taxation (UK Governement, 
2005). For taxes paid in UK, a tax credit can be utilized against US taxes. For fiscal year 2018 
weighted US tax rate was 28%. A US federal tax rate change from 35% to 21% in 2017, has 
impacted the club’s debt policy, reducing debt tax shield and deferred tax assets. Current 
statutory tax rates for Manchester United are 21% for the US and 19% for the UK. 
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5.3 Reformulations of historical financial Income statement and Balance sheet 
5.3.1 Reformulated and adjusted income statement 
The purpose of accounting reformulations is to create a basis for forecasting future levels of 
earnings. To get a better understanding of the firm’s underlying performance, it is needed to 
look into what the firm “normally” generates of profit through its core business activities. 
What is a sustainable level the firm’s core business can perform at? To answer that, it is 
necessary to separate operational items from investing and financing items, as they have 
different implications for the valuation. While the operational business activities affect the 
firm’s creation of value, financing activities affect the allocation of value among the firm’s 
capital providers (Healy et al., 2019, p. 87). Throughout this financial statement analysis end 
of fiscal year values are used. Maybe a different approach with an average of starting and 
ending balance would yield different results. However, for simplicity year-end values are used 
consistently. 
 
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Revenue 431 888  393 916  514 009  579 944  588 651  625 373  
Operating expenses 371 665-  386 571-  435 931-  510 593-  563 905-  602 520-  
Net disposal player reg. 6 991     23 649   9 786-     10 926   18 119   25 799   
Operating profit 67 214   30 994   68 292   80 277   42 865   48 652   
Net investment income 701        654        558        538        1 270     1 333     
Finance costs 27 668-   35 419-   20 459-   25 013-   19 281-   25 470-   
Finance income 256        204        442        736        1 243     2 961     
Net finance cost 27 412-   35 215-   20 017-   24 277-   18 038-   22 509-   
Profit before tax 40 503   3 567-     48 833   56 538   26 097   27 476   
Tax 16 668-   2 672     12 462-   17 361-   5 740-     8 595-     
Profit 23 835   895-        36 371   39 177   20 357   18 881   
Reformulated Income statement Manchester United  £ '000
 
 Table 5-2 Reformulated income statement 
 
5.3.1.1 Adjusted elements of reformulated income statement 
Gain/loss on disposals of assets 
Net gains on disposals of Property, plant and equipment is moved from operating costs to Net 
investment income, as disposals of PPE is not considered part of Manchester United’s core 
business of running a football club. Normally, Net disposal of intangibles would also be 
removed from operating results. However, selling and buying players is an obvious part of a 
football club’s operational activities. Manchester United have even expanded their scouting 
network lately to capitalize more on player trading (Fay, 2019). Gains/losses on player 
registrations will therefore remain in the calculation of operating profit.  
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Investment properties 
Income and costs from Investment properties (Manchester United, 2019, p. note 14) is moved 
from operational results to Net investment income. Investment properties are held by the club 
for rental yields and capital appreciation (Manchester United, 2018a, p. note 2.13), and they 
are not occupied by the group or its subsidiaries. An argument for keeping Investment 
property as part of operations is that all properties are located in the local Manchester area. It 
could possibly be a strategic element for future expansion. In addition, the club do not 
recognize Investment properties as a seperate business segment. However, in this analysis 
Investment property will be treated as an investment item.  
 
Foreign currency exchange 2018 
Foreign exchange gains of £ 4.9 million on retranslation of unhedged US dollar borrowings 
2018 is recognized in finance income, opposite other years. Exchange gains/losses related to 
financing activities is normally recognized in finance costs. It could be a random accounting 
error and it has been adjusted to avoid distortion of cost of debt calculations in analysis later 
on. 
 
Write-off deferred tax asset 2018 
On December 22, 2017, the US federal corporate tax rate was reduced from 35% to 21%. This 
led to a revaluation of the US deferred tax position resulting in a write-off of £49 million 
(Manchester United, 2018a, p. note 10), affecting the profit for the year accordingly. 
Considering this as a one-time incident, the effect will be ignored as it is not representative of 
the club’s long-term profit generating ability. In relation to the write-off an unrealized foreign 
exchange loss of £8.8 million has also been removed. It can be argued, that with the complex 
tax arrangements and involvement with several tax jurisdictions, these types of tax changes 
will occur from time to time and should be incorporated into the analysis. However, such 
large tax rate change is considered rare, and therefore the choice of ignoring the effect is 
made in this thesis. 
 
Exceptional items 
Exceptional items, would normally be considered one-time events and removed from the 
“normalized” income statement. However, as this part mainly comprises of compensation for 
terminated contracts with dismissed managers and coaching staff, it can be argued to be part 
of a football club’s operational activity. Manchester United have since 2014 dismissed three 
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managers, Jose Mourinho, Lois Van Gaal and David Moyes, resulting in compensation 
payments. Frequent manager changes is a common trait of the industry. A total of 14 Premier 
League clubs changed managers during the 2018/19 season (Transfermarkt, n.d.-f), 
emphasizing the trend. In addition, for a company of Manchester United’s size and 
complexity it is likely to incur a certain level of execptional items, hence the lack of 
adjustment in this analysis.  
 
5.3.2 Reformulated balance sheet 
For analytical purposes, the balance sheet will be reformulated and regrouped into 
operational, non-operational investments and financing items. This will be useful for the ratio 
analysis in the next chapter, as it will facilitate evaluating different functional areas of the 
firm. To calculate operating cash, an average cash-to-revenue ratio for the peer group 
including Manchester United, is used. The average cash-to-revenue ratio for the group was 
approximately 30% for period 2014-18 and will be implemented in the analysis. There are 
other ways of estimating operating cash. Nonetheless, assuming the football industry as cash 
heavy, with paying employees’ wages as a significant part, the choice fell on average cash-to-
revenue ratio.  
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2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Operating cash 66 365  118 175 154 203 173 983 176 595 187 612 
Inventories -       -       926       1 637    1 416    2 130    
Trade and other receivables 125 119 83 627  128 657 103 732 168 060 77 601  
Tax receivable -       124       -       -       1 347    643       
Derivative financial instruments -       27        7 888    3 218    1 159    312       
Tax liabilities 2 999    2 105    6 867    9 772    3 874    2 859    
Trade and other payables 102 232 131 283 199 668 190 315 267 996 230 386 
Deferred revenue 180 613 186 608 188 844 207 245 183 567 190 146 
Derivative financial instruments 2 477    2 966    2 800    1 253    -       -       
Operating working capital 96 837-  121 009- 106 505- 126 015- 106 860- 155 093- 
Goodwill 421 453 421 453 421 453 421 453 421 453 421 453 
Property, plant and equipment 254 859 250 626 245 714 244 738 245 401 246 032 
Intangible assets 204 572 238 944 244 181 296 091 378 187 347 404 
Trade and other receivables 41        3 836    11 223  15 399  4 724    9 889    
Net derivatives -       2 769-    6 877-    1 011    4 807    2 268-    
(-)Net deferred tax liabilities 100 794- 116 329- 131 096- 121 279- 35 415-  26 550-  
Trade and other payables 42 464  48 078  41 450  83 587  104 271 79 183  
Deferred revenue 15 631  21 583  38 899  39 648  37 085  33 354  
Net non-current oper assets 923 624 958 758 966 441 976 736 948 631 936 523 
Net operating assets 826 787 837 749 859 936 850 721 841 771 781 430 
Excess cash -       37 577  74 991  116 284 65 427  120 025 
Investment property 13 671  13 559  13 447  13 966  13 836  24 979  
Non-operating investments 13 671  51 136  88 438  130 250 79 263  145 004 
Total business assets 840 458 888 885 948 374 980 971 921 034 926 434 
Current debt 15 005  485       5 564    5 724    9 074    5 453    
Non-current debt 326 803 410 482 484 528 497 630 486 694 505 779 
Interest-bearing debt 341 808 410 967 490 092 503 354 495 768 511 232 
Equity 498 650 477 918 458 282 477 616 425 265 415 202 
Invested capital 840 458 888 885 948 374 980 970 921 033 926 434 
Reformulated balance sheet Manchester United  £ '000
 
 Table 5-3 Reformulated Balance sheet 
 
6 Financial analysis 
Healy et al. (2019, p. 175) presents four levers that managers can use to achieve their growth 
and profit targets. These levers are Operating management, Investment management, 
Financing management and Dividend policy. An analysis of profitability, leverage and growth 
ratios (section 6.1-4) and a Cash flow analysis (section 6.5) can be helpful in getting insights 
on how effective the firm’s policies are in these areas and support the forecast in chapter 7.  
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Item Definition
Income statement items
Interest expense after tax Interest expense X (1–Tax rate)
Net investment profit after tax 
(NIPAT)
(Investment income + Interest income) X (1–Tax 
rate)
Net operating profit after tax 
(NOPAT)
Profit or loss – NIPAT + interest expense after tax
Balance sheet items
Operating working capital (Current assets – Excess cash and cash equivalents) 
– (Current liabilities – Current debt and current 
portion of non-current debt)
Net non-current operating 
assets
Non-current tangible and intangible assets + (Net) 
derivatives – (Net) deferred tax liability – Non-
interest-bearing non-current liabilities
Non-operating investments Other non-operating investments + Excess cash and 
cash equivalents
Net operating assets Operating working capital + Net non-current 
operating assets
Business assets Net operating assets + Non-operating investments
Debt Total interest-bearing non-current liabilities + 
Current debt and current portion of non-current debt
Invested capital Debt + Group equity
 
Table 6-1 Definitions of accounting items in ratio analysis 
 
6.1 Overall profitability 
Return on equity (ROE) is a comprehensive indicator of how well the management employs 
the funds invested by the shareholders. ROE is calculated by dividing profit with shareholder 
equity.  
 
ROE % 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Average
Arsenal 2,3 6,1 0,5 9,7 13,5 -6,9 4,2
Juventus -15,7 5,1 7,6 45,4 -26,7 -127,7 -18,6
Real Madrid 10,5 10,2 6,8 4,5 6,3 7,2 7,6
Peer average -0,9 7,1 5,0 19,9 -2,3 -42,5 -2,3
MUFC 4,8 -0,2 7,9 8,2 -8,8 4,5 2,7  
Table 6-2 ROE for Manchester United and the peer group 
 
From table 6-2 it is noticeable Juventus’ ROE varies significantly, while Real Madrid have a 
steadier return on equity. Juventus’ massive 45% ROE for 2017 is mainly due to selling Paul 
Pogba to Manchester United for €97 million after signing him for free in 2012. The negative 
ROE of 128% in 2019 is related to buying star player Ronaldo, causing increased wages and 
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amortizations (Juventus, 2020). Without going further into details, it’s worth to mention the 
player trading and player wages can cause a huge impact on a club’s financial results from 
year to year. Also, noticeably from table 6-2 is Manchester United’s negative ROE of 8.8% in 
2018. This was mainly due to the deferred tax write-off of £49 million mentioned in section 
5.3.1. In general, it appears shareholders of football clubs experience highly varying returns 
both between clubs and from year to year. Numbers in table 6-2 is calculated before any 
accounting reformulations. From now on the reformulated statements in section 5.3 will be 
used. 
 
6.2 Profitability decomposed 
By decomposing Return on equity (ROE), performance evaluation can be allocated to three 
functional areas management can influence by their policies and strategies. The areas of 
operations, non-operating investments and financing is looked into and historical levels and 
trends is utilized for future forecasting. Return on equity is by Healy et al. (2019, p. 181) 
defined as follows: 
 
ROE = Return on invested capital (ROIC) + Spread x Financial leverage   (Equation 1) 
 
6.2.1 Return on invested capital (ROIC) 
Return on invested capital is a profitability ratio reflecting how well management utilizes its 
operating and non-operating assets to generate profit. ROIC would be the company’s ROE if 
it was financed with equity only. ROIC can be split into return on net operating assets 
(RNOA) and return on non-operating investment (RNOI). Table 6-3 shows ROIC is close to 
RNOA for both United and Arsenal. That is foremost because of a small portion of invested 
capital is non-operating investments, implying non-operating investments are a less important 
component of the clubs’ profitability. For both clubs return on non-operating investments 
(RNOI) decreases ROIC slightly, which is in line with most firms having RNOI lower than 
RNOA (Healy et al., 2019, p. 182). 
 
6.2.2 Return on net operating assets (RNOA) 
RNOA is a measure of the operating component of ROE. Arsenal’s varying returns are due to 
player trading, and in line with section 6.1 it confirms the significant effect player trading can 
have on a club’s profitability. In 2015 and 2018 Manchester United had their lowest NOPAT 
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and RNOA. This is mainly because of the structure of broadcasting revenues. As explained in 
section 5.2.4, broadcasting contracts work on a three-year basis, and 2015 and 2018 were the 
years when neither Premier League nor UEFA contracts were renewed. With no increase in 
the broadcasting revenue base these years, operating ratios suffered. The importance of these 
three-year cycles is affecting the forecasting in the chapter 7. 
 
6.2.3 Spread 
Spread is explained as “the incremental economic effect from introducing debt into the capital 
structure” (Healy et al., 2019, p. 181). When ROIC is above the cost of borrowing, spread is 
positive and borrowing has a positive economic effect, and vice versa when ROIC is below 
cost of debt, borrowing decreases ROE. A common benchmark for ROIC is Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital (WACC). For 2015 Manchester United had a negative spread of 
3.1%, caused mainly by two reasons. Firstly, 2015 is the only year of the analysis period 
United did not participate in European tournaments, affecting operating profitability ratios 
negatively. Secondly, associated with re-negotiation of the terms of their loans (Manchester 
United, 2015, p. note 24), extra costs incurred, increasing cost of debt for the year. The 
consequence was a ROIC lower than cost of debt, hence a negative spread causing a negative 
ROE for the year. With a borderline average spread of 0,3% United’s financing policy is close 
to being optimized, indicating a well-functioning component of the club’s financing strategy. 
Comparing with Arsenal, the effect of player trading causes a high degree of fluctuations, 
making it difficult to make sound comparisons.  
 
Ratio 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2017 2018 2019
Net operating profit margin % 9,5 5,5 9,5 9,4 5,5 5,7 11,0 15,6 -4,4
x Net operating asset turnover 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,7 0,8 0,8 0,7 0,6
(=) Return on net oper. assets % 5,0 2,6 5,7 6,4 3,9 4,6 9,4 10,5 -2,8
x Net operating assets/invested cap 1,0 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,8 0,9 1,0 1,1
(+)Return on non-Oper. Invest. % 4,6 1,1 0,7 0,6 2,3 2,3 1,1 0,9 1,1
x Non-op invest/invested capital 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,2 0,1
(=) Return on invested capital % 5,0 2,5 5,2 5,7 3,7 4,2 8,4 10,4 -2,9
Spread % -0,3 -3,1 2,5 2,4 0,9 0,3 2,3 6,6 -8,4
x Financial leverage 0,7 0,9 1,1 1,1 1,2 1,2 0,6 0,5 0,5
(=) Financial leverage gain % -0,2 -2,7 2,7 2,6 1,1 0,3 1,3 3,0 -4,0
ROE=ROIC+Fin.leverage gain % 4,8 -0,2 7,9 8,2 4,8 4,5 9,7 13,5 -6,9
Manchester United Arsenal
 
Table 6-3 Distinguishing operating, investment and financing components of ROE   
(Manchester United, 2019) and (Arsenal, 2020) 
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6.2.4 NOPAT margin decomposed  
As the starting point for the profitability decomposition in table 6-3, a NOPAT margin 
decomposition can give more insights on how Manchester United maintain their level of 
profit. NOPAT, defined as net operating profit after tax, is a measure of a firm’s core 
operating performance, net of taxes, reflecting operating policies and eliminitating effects of 
debt policies. NOPAT is calculated by profit of the year plus interest expense after tax, minus 
investment profit after tax. NOPAT margin is NOPAT divided by revenue. A decomposition 
of NOPAT margin will be compiled when forecasting NOPAT margin in the next chapter. 
 
6.3 Financial leverage analysis 
Financial leverage allows firms to increase their asset base in excess of equity. In line with the 
previous section, ROE will increase as long as cost of liabilities is lower than return on 
investing these funds. It must be taken into account that with liabilities also comes risk. If 
failing to meet the liability obligations it could cause financial distress. Financial leverage 
ratios are a way to measure the firm’s degree of risk from financial leverage.  
 
6.3.1 Liquidity  
A key indicator of a firm’s short-term liquidity is the current ratio. Current ratio (current 
assets/current liabilities) of more than 1 is indicating the firm is able to meet their short-term 
liability obligations. If some current assets are hard to liquidate, such as difficulties to collect 
trade receivables, the firm might still face liquidity problems in spite of a current ratio above 
1. Another indicator of the firm’s ability to cover short-term liabilities is the cash ratio. The 
cash ratio captures the firm’s ability to cover its current liabilities with highly liquid assets as 
in cash and cash equivalents. Analysts consider a cash ratio between 0,5-1 to be healthy. 
 
From table 6-5 it appears both United and Arsenal have relatively healthy liquidity ratios, 
with United slightly below their London rivals. A quick glance at their foreign peers, Juventus 
(0,03) (Juventus, 2020) and Real Madrid (0,4) (Real Madrid, 2019), it stands out they have 
significantly lower cash ratios for 2019 than their English peers. This could possibly originate 
from the English domestic broadcasting revenue supremacy (table 2-2). 
 
Some features of the football industry ease the clubs’ liquidity challenges. Season tickets are 
paid in advance, and also parts of broadcasting revenue are paid pre-season, which can equip 
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the clubs to better meet their short-time financial obligations. Lastly, an indication that 
Manchester United is not facing severe liquidity problems, is that their revolving facility with 
instant credit access, has remained untouched since the recession in 2009 (Manchester United, 
2019, p. 59). 
 
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2017 2018 2019
Current ratio 0,6 0,7 0,9 1,0 0,9 0,9 1,2 1,4 1,0
Cash ratio 0,2 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,5 0,7 0,8 0,9 0,7
Manchester United Arsenal
 
Table 6-5 Liquidity ratios 
 
6.3.2 Solvency 
Whereas liquidity focus on short-term risk, a solvency analysis sheds light on long-term risk 
of failing financial obligations and the ability to withstand economic downturns and possible 
bankruptcy. A solid equity-to-capital ratio gives the firm a buffer through challenging times. 
What is considered a solid ratio, varies between industries, and normally stable industries 
with steady cashflows require less equity percentage of total capital. With the football 
industry’s complexity and instability, it is challenging to find an appropriate benchmark. 
From table 6-6 it appears both United and Arsenal have presumably solid solvency ratios. 
Comparing equity share of capital with peers Juventus and Real Madrid, Juventus (0,03) 
appear as riskier than Real Madrid (0,5) who is slightly above their English rivals. 
 
A measure of the firm’s ability to meet their long-term debt obligations is interest coverage 
ratio. Earnings based interest coverage is defined as (Profit or loss + Interest expense after 
tax) divided by Interest expense after tax. It indicates at what ease the firm can meet its 
interest payments. The higher the coverage ratio, the greater the cushion the firm has to meet 
interest obligations.  
 
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2017 2018 2019
Equity-to-capital 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4
Interest coverage 2,3 1,0 3,7 3,4 1,8 1,9 3,9 8,6 -1,6
Manchester United Arsenal
 
Table 6-6 Solvency ratios 
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6.4 Sustainable growth 
A comprehensive manner of assessing the firm’s ratios, is the concept of sustainable growth. 
(Healy et al., 2019, p. 194). The sustainable growth rate is defined by Healy et al. as ROE – 
(1 – Dividend payout rate) and it reflects the rate at which the firm can grow, keeping their 
operating, investing, financing and dividend policies unchanged (Healy et al., 2019, p. 195). 
Since none of United’s peers pays dividends, their basis for comparison will be their ROE, 
naturally resulting in Manchester United on average having a lower sustainable growth rate 
then their peers. Because of their abnormally fluctuating results, Juventus have been left out 
of this ratio comparison. 
 
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Average
MUFC 4,8 -0,2 3,6 3,3 -0,4 -1,1 1,7
Arsenal 2,3 6,1 0,5 9,7 13,5 -6,9 4,2
Real Madrid 10,5 10,2 6,8 4,5 6,3 7,2 7,6  
Table 6-7 Sustainable growth rate 
 
6.5 Cash flow analysis 
The purpose of a cash flow analysis is to get further insights into the operating, investment 
and financing policies of the firm.  
 
6.5.1 Cash flow statement preparation 
Healy et al. (2019, p. 198) differs between two formats of reporting cash flows. The main 
difference is in the way operating cash flow is reported. The direct format, not commonly 
used, reports operating cash receipts and disbursments directly. The indirect format, used by 
Manchester United, starts with Profit before tax and makes adjustments to arrive at the 
operating cash flow before changes in working capital. First adjustment is adding back 
depreciation and amortisation, because they are non-cash charges. Second adjustment is 
subtracting taxes paid adjusted for debt tax shield. This adjustment is made to ensure cash 
flow from operations is independent from the firm’s financing structure. Other adjustments 
include deferred taxes, gains or losses from non-operating investments and other items not 
considered part of the operating cash flow. 
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2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Avg.
Profit before tax 40,5   3,6-    48,8   56,5   26,1   27,5   32,6   
Depreciation and amortisation 64,0   110,0 98,1   134,7 149,1 140,9 116,1 
Tax paid and debt tax shield 11,1-   19,7-   6,7-    12,1-   11,9-   6,7-    11,4-   
Other adjustments 21,8   13,1   32,1   18,2   18,1   4,7    18,0   
Operat.CF before changes in WC 115,2 99,9   172,4 197,3 181,4 166,4 155,4 
Changes in Working Capital 24,6-   75,5   21,8   42,3   73,8-   90,5   22,0   
Operat.CF before invest. activities 90,6   175,4 194,2 239,6 107,7 256,9 177,4 
Interest received 0,3    0,5    0,5    0,7    1,2    2,9    1,0    
Net cash used in investing activities 89,7-   102,3- 104,8- 151,0- 121,3- 161,3- 121,7- 
Free CF available to Debt&Equity 1,1    73,6   89,9   89,4   12,4-   98,4   56,7   
Interest paid after tax 18,1-   31,9-   8,6-    12,7-   13,6-   15,0-   16,6-   
Net repayments of borrowing 5,0-    44,6   0,4-    0,4-    0,4-    3,8-    5,8    
Free CF available to Equity 21,9-   86,3   80,9   76,3   26,4-   79,7   45,8   
Dividends paid -    -    20,1-   23,3-   22,0-   23,3-   22,2-   
Net change in cash 21,9-   86,3   60,8   53,0   48,4-   56,4   31,0   
Exchange gains on cash 6,1-    3,1    12,6   8,1    0,2    9,2    4,5    
Cash at beginning of year 94,4   66,4   155,8 229,2 290,3 242,0 179,7 
Cash at end of year 66,4   155,8 229,2 290,3 242,0 307,6 215,2 
Reformulated Cash flow statement Manchester United  £ million
 
Table 6-8 Cash flow statement 
 
6.5.2 Analysis of cash flow information 
The cash flow statement in table 6-8 highlights a few key cash flow measures. Operating cash 
flow before changes in working capital focus on whether the company is able to generate a 
cash surplus from their operating activities. From table 6-8 we see Manchester United have a 
relatively stable cash flow from operations the last four years. The lowpoint of 2015 is mainly 
due to previously mentioned circumstances in regard to re-negotiated debt and lack of 
participation in UEFA-tournaments. Changes in working capital varies significantly. Part of 
the reason for this is large cash movements from the player trading. A common industry 
practise is to divide payments for player over several financial periods, adding to accounting 
complexity in regards to player trading. Operating cashflow before investing activities, 
signals the club’s ability to invest in foremost new players. This is an important measure for 
Manchester United as they have had to go through some changing of their squad, due to 
frequent managerial changes. Also, if the expected continuation of squad renewal the next 
couple of years will be realized, the importance of maintaining their level of operating cash 
flow before investing activities is important.  
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The club have averaged a free cash flow of £57 million available to debt and equity and £ 48 
million available to equity for the analysis period. This indicates their financing and dividend 
policies are sustainable. With an yearly average net increase of cash of £ 31 million, cash at 
hand has increased from £ 66 million in 2014 to £ 308 million in 2019. Since interest-bearing 
debt has been stable after 2015, the club’s internal cash flow has been sufficient to sustain 
both operating and investment policies. It appear as a healthy sign they create enough cash 
from their operations to sustain their operating and investment strategies and policies. 
 
Free cashflow available to debt and quity and free cashflow available to debt are critical input 
for the cashflow based valuation of firm’s assets and equity respectively (Healy et al, 2019, p. 
201). 
 
7 Prospective analysis: Forecast 
A prospective analysis with two main tasks, forecasting and valuation, is made with an 
forward looking view. In this chapter a forecast summarize insights from the previous 
chapters. A comprehensive approach will be taken to guard against unreasonable implicit 
assumptions such as out of proportion levels of working capital, plant assets and leverage. 
The forecast is for an explicit period of 2020-2029 with 2029 as the terminal year, and it will 
contain detailed earnings, balance and cashflow predictions for each year. The terminal year 
is when it is assumed steady state is reached. In steady state, continuing values from fixed 
growth rates and ratios are estimated. Continuing values are assumed being constant for the 
reminding lifespan of the company, which is assumed “eternal”.  
 
7.1 Explicit forecast period 2020-2029 
A good starting point is according to Healy et al. (2019, p. 235) earnings benchmarks based 
on historical results without further information. They claim research shows these 
benchmarks are almost as accurate as forecasts performed by professional analysts with 
access to rich information. In that respect, initial benchmarks in this analysis will be historical 
average for the company, with adjustments grounded in strategic, accounting and financial 
analysis. The more relevant and reliable information obtainable, the less emphasis will be put 
on the initial benchmarks. The forecast follows the ROE decomposition of operating, non-
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operating investments and financing drivers. For a comprehensive forecast, eight forecast 
drivers (table 7-1), is needed. These will be outlined in the sections to follow. 
 
Ratio % 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Avrg Trend Avrg Trend
Revenue growth -8,8 30,5 12,8 1,5 6,2 8,5 N/A N/A N/A
NOPAT margin 9,5 5,5 9,5 9,4 5,5 5,7 7,5 -1,6 6,7 26,3
Oper. WC/Revenue -22,4 -30,7 -20,7 -21,7 -18,2 -24,8 -23,1 -5,9 -11,7 -83,5
Net non-cur oper assets/rev 213,9 243,4 188,0 168,4 161,2 149,8 187,4 -6,2 144,9 3,3
Non-oper. invest./revenue 3,2 13,0 17,2 22,5 13,5 23,2 15,4 81,1 31,0 -6,2
A/tax ret. non-op.invest/rev 4,6 1,1 0,7 0,6 2,3 2,3 1,9 27,9 1,0 4,8
After tax cost of debt -5,3 -5,6 -2,7 -3,2 -2,8 -3,9 -3,9 -0,2 -5,3 -10,0
Debt-to-capital 40,7 46,2 51,7 51,3 53,8 55,2 49,8 6,4 36,9 -5,9
ArsenalManchester United
 
Table 7-1 Historical Forecast driver ratios 
 
Forecasting assumptions 
A ten year explicit forecast period is the time expected for Manchester United to reach an 
assumed steady state. The relatively long timeframe is mainly due to the growth in 
broadcasting revenues. With recent signs of diminishing growth, a few three-year cycles to 
capture an estimated development is required. A disadvantage of a ten year forecast horizont 
versus a shorter one is that measures such as earnings, cashflows and operating working 
capital often can be accurately predicted the next year or two, but the amount of 
uncertaintanty increases for each year. Towards year 9 and 10 it is more of a long shot. 
Another assumption is that the beginning balance sheet values 2020 is equal to ending values 
2019 and so forth for each forthcoming year. 
 
7.1.1 Revenue growth analysis 
For the historic analysis period 2014-19, Maanchester United’s revenue has seen an average 
annual growth of 8,5 %, on par with an industry growth of 8.6% (table 7-2). The growth can 
probably be linked to a growing demand for televised football, and an increasing worldwide 
exposure through digital media, enhancing commercial revenues. It is difficult to predict how 
long this growth will continue and at what strength. Kantar media’s latest report (Manchester 
United, 2019a) on United’s fan/follower base indicate a possible connection to the emergence 
of the Asian middle class, as United’s fanbase have more than doubled in Asia since 2012. 
However, more reliable indicators will be needed to draw such conclusion. A likely more 
reliable indicator is the principle of mean reverting. Historically, European firms tend to 
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revert to a “normal” level of 5-7% revenue growth within 3-10 years (Healyet al., 2019, p. 
236). Whether an English football club can be compared with European firms is arguable. 
Nevertheless, more relevant is the principle of growth returning to a “normal” level. 
 
To forecast future revenue growth rates, main revenue drivers is looked into historically and 
predicted for both the forecasting and continuing period. Table 7-2 shows decomposed annual 
revenue growth rates for Manchester United 2014-19, and the average annual growth rate for 
United and the industry for the same period. The industry numbers are collected from 
Deloitte’s Money League report ( (Deloitte, 2020), and it includes the 20 highest revenue 
generating clubs in Europe.  
 
Revenue growth (%) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 MU Industry 
Commercial 4,1 36,4 2,7 0,2 -0,5 10,8 8,0
Broadcasting -20,7 30,4 38,2 5,2 18,2 13,3 11,0
Matchday -16,2 17,7 4,7 -1,7 0,9 1,1 4,0
Total revenue MU -8,8 30,5 12,8 1,5 6,2 8,5 N/A
Total revenue Industry 7,6 11,9 6,5 5,6 11,3 N/A 8,6
AverageManchester United
 
Table 7-2 Historical revenue growth rates 
 
Since no company can outgrow the world economy long term, a terminal growth rate of 3% 
will be used. The 3% is anchored in International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) GDP real growth 
rate from 1980-2019 (IMF, n.d). IMF’s rate of 3.47% has been reduced to 3% because less 
developed countries grow at a faster pace influencing overall rate. Additionaly, Healy et al. 
(2019, p. 242) argue for a world economic average growth rate of 3%. An alternate option 
often used in valuation is the relevant, in this case the UK, long term inflation rate. An 
argument for favoring worldwide GDP growth in this analysis, is Manchester United’s 
worldwide exposure and connection to international markets, including large fanbases on all 
continents.  
 
7.1.1.1 Commercial revenue 
For the commercial section, the 36 % growth from 2015 to 2016 stands out (table 7-2). The 
reason behind this abnormal growth is that up until July 2015, all of Manchester United’s 
retail, merchandising, apparel and product licensing business was managed by Nike. After 
July 2015, the club took control of all of its own commercial business, hence the increase in 
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commercial revenues for 2016 (Manchester United, 2016, p. 30). In light of this restructuring, 
an annual growth rate of 10.8% as base for predicting future growth, seems too high. The 
apparent struggle to keep the same level after the restructuring, could be caused by some 
organizational startup problems. For the sponsorship part of the commercial section, ideally it 
could have been separated and decomposed to a detailed report. However, since the club has 
numerous sponsors and partnership deals, some of which are contingent, it will be too 
complicated and the sponsorship part will remain part of the commercial section.  
 
Manchester United’s commercial revenue is stimulated by their global expansion strategy, 
expanding their fanbase, and there is no clear indication this will change in spite of mediocre 
sporting results. As an example, the Alibaba contract gives the club direct access to advertise 
club content on Alibaba’s media platforms and its 700 million users. Another example is 
Kantar Media’s aforementioned report showing United’s worldwide fan/follover base has 
increased by 70% since 2012. A larger fan base fuels commercial revenue growth and for 
2020 the 3-year trend of a slight diminishing growth is expected to turn around. With this in 
mind, it is assumed that United will gradually increase the commercial growth for the next 4 
years approaching historical industry average of 8%, before competitive market forces drive 
the growth back to an expected continuing rate of 3%.  
 
7.1.1.2 Broadcasting revenue 
Varying broadcasting revenues depend on numerous factors. The 3-year broadcasting deal 
cycles and first team performance both presumably have significant impact. Both Premier 
League and UEFA have historically made contracts of 3-year cycles with the broadcasting 
companies. When the deals increase in value, more money falls to the participating clubs, 
giving the clubs’ broadcasting revenue a bump every third year.  
 
Premier League 
Premier League’s new broadcasting deal for 2020-22 is up 8% from its previous period. 
While the domestic rights slightly decline in value, the international broadcasters are paying 
30% more this period (Associated Press, 2019). The domestic stagnation could signal the 
market has matured, or it can be a correctional adjustment from two previous high growth 
periods, as described in section 2.1.5. Predicting the period 2023-29 is difficult due to big 
variations the previous periods. However, indications the international market still has growth 
potential, the Premier League broadcasting rights is expected to continue growing by 8% in 
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2023-25 . After that, a growth rate of 5% is expected in 2026, due to the recent numbers for 
2020-22 are signalling a lower growth rate, before landing on 3% terminal growth in 2029. 
The years with no renewal of broadcasting contracts, a 3% “normal” growth is expected.  
 
UEFA 
UEFA’s last two broadcasting deals have seen an increase of 50% in 2016 and 40% 2019 
(UEFA, 2020). This explains part of United’s growth these years. In 2015 the team wasn’t 
qualified for any European competition, hence the negative growth of 20%. The highest 
growth year of 2017 can be explained by the Premier League entering a new 3-year period of 
broadcasting rights with a 65% value increase, in addition to the club winning the Europa 
League, resulting in increased revenue from UEFA as well.  
 
In their Club licensing benchmarking report for financial year 2018, UEFA stated revenues 
for participants of European club tournaments could expect  “large increases at all levels” 
(UEFA, 2020, p. 74). This is confirmed by Manchester United more than doubling their 
UEFA-revenue from 2018 to 2019 (Manchester United, 2019b, p. 51). Assuming the trend 
from UEFA’s broadcasting cycles with previous 50% and 40% growth continues, an 
estimated growth reduction of 10% every third year is expected for 2022-29, before ending on 
a terminal growth rate of 3% 
 
Manchester United Television (MUTV) 
Accounting for only 5% of Manchester Uniteds broadcasting revenue, MUTV is less relevant, 
and a simplified approach assuming 3% yearly growth will be applied, reflecting expected 
economic worldwide growth. 
 
7.1.1.3 Matchday revenue 
Matchday revenue depend on number of homegames played, attendance percentage and 
general price level. Since most games are usually sold out, what matters most is the number of 
homegames played, which again is linked to the level of sporting success. Manchester United 
have 1% average growth for 2014-19, compared to industry growth of 4% (table 7-2). The 
difference is partly due to several clubs expanding or changing stadiums, allowing larger 
attendance increasing matchday revenue. Instead of expanding attendance capacity, 
Manchester United’s strategy is to change the composition of the stadium. With recent 
developing of hospitality facilities like VIP boxes, which sell at a higher price, matchday 
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revenue is expected to increase and margins improved (Manchester United, 2019b, p. 44). For 
the forecast period 2020-29 previous growth rate of 1% will be used and added 2% for the 
hospitality suites strategy, adjoining the terminal rate of 3%. 
 
7.1.1.4 Summary revenue growth forecast Manchester United 
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Commercial 4 5 6 7 8 7 6 5 4 3
PL broadcasting 8 3 3 8 3 3 5 3 3 3
UEFA broadcasting 3 3 30 3 3 20 3 3 10 3
MUTV 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Matchday 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Implied growth rate 4,6 5,9 5,8 5,9 5,2 7,4 4,8 3,9 4,6 3,0
Manchester United Expected revenue growth %
 
Table 7-3 Revenue growth forecast 
 
7.1.2 NOPAT margin 
Expressing key NOPAT drivers as percentage of revenue (table 7-4), is helpful when 
forecasting NOPAT margin. Trend is the average annual growth rate and an indicator for the 
future growth development. The factors influencing changes of NOPAT margin are in italics 
and is considered when forecasting NOPAT margin. 
 
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Average Trend
Revenue 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Disposal of intangibles 1,6 6,0 -1,9 1,9 3,1 4,1 2,5 7,5
Employee benefits 49,7 51,4 45,2 45,4 50,3 53,1 49,2 1,6
Amortization 12,8 25,3 17,1 21,5 23,5 20,7 20,1 17,6
Other operating costs 23,5 21,4 22,5 21,2 22,0 22,5 22,2 -0,7
Total operating costs 86,1 98,1 84,8 88,0 95,8 96,3 91,5 2,7
Operating profit before tax 15,6 7,9 13,3 13,8 7,3 7,8 10,9
Invest. and interest income 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,7 0,3
Interest expense -6,4 -9,0 -4,0 -4,3 -3,3 -4,1 -5,2
Tax expense -3,9 0,7 -2,4 -3,0 -2,5 -1,4 -2,1 -122,7
Profit 5,5 -0,2 7,1 6,8 2,0 3,0 4,0
(-)After tax inv & int income 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,3 0,5 0,2
After tax interest expense 4,2 5,8 2,6 2,8 2,4 3,2 3,5
NOPAT Margin 9,5 5,5 9,5 9,4 4,0 5,7 7,3 3,0
Manchester United NOPAT margin decomposed
 
Table 7-4 NOPAT margin decomposed  
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Disposals of intangible assets (Player trading) 
As discussed in the strategic analysis in chapter 3, Manchester United is considered to 
develop a competitive advantage, due to investement in scouting network, comprehensive 
statistics analysis and prioritizing creating homegrown talent. The player trading profit-to-
revenue ratio is on average 2.5 % for 2014-2019 (table 7-4) with an inclining trend. 
Considering the rebuilding, as mentioned in chapter 3, will take “a few years” and investment 
in established key players is still needed, the profitability of player trading is expected to be 
stable the next 3 years and then increase as a result of being self-sufficient with talent, before 
declining because of competitive market forces. Departing from and arriving at 3%, with a 
more profitable period of 5% profit in the middle years 2023-25 seems reasonable with 
respect to average levels and competitive strategy. Estimated effect on NOPAT margin is 
displayed in table 7-5. 
 
Employee benefits 
The largest cost group in the industry is employee benefits, often referred to as wage costs. 
Employee benefits includes wages, bonuses and other benefits paid to employees. It is 
assumed that the main portion of the cost group is the players’ and managing staff’s salaries. 
Detailed information about the wage costs is not publicly available, hence the assumption. An 
example of wage distribution is that more than 90% of Juventus’ wage costs for 2019 were to 
their players and technical staff (Juventus, 2020). 
 
Manchester United’s wage costs-to-revenue ratio has on average been 5% lower than the peer 
group (table 7-5). The increase the last two seasons, can be connected to the previously 
mentioned Alexis Sanchez, who came as a free agent and became the highest paid player in 
the Premier League’s history. His contract expires in July 2022, and is likely to affect overall 
wages. Not only does his wages disappear from the payroll, but the signal effect of United 
paying such high wages will be diminshed and could reduce future wage levels. The strategy 
section concludes players currently are moderately increasing their bargaining power, 
implying higher wage costs. However, the increasing wages must be seen in conjunction with 
the broadcasting “revolution” and also expect to slow down as the broadcasting growth slows 
down. On that basis, in addition to the Sanchez effect, employee benefits-to-revenue ratio is 
expected to gradually decrease from their 2019-level of 53% towards a 50% level, more in 
line with their average level of 49%. 
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Amortization 
A similar measure to NOPAT, often used for valuation, is EBITDA, earnings before interest, 
tax, depreciation and amortization. The main argument for favoring NOPAT instead of 
EBITDA in this thesis, is that amortization is a real operating expense and too important part 
of a football club’s consumption of resources to ignore. Amortization, one of two main cost 
drivers in the industry, together with employee benefits account for approximately ¾ of 
operating costs, hence they are two key elements of changes in the NOPAT margin.  
 
Manchester United’s amortization-to-revenue ratio seem to have stabilized around 20% (table 
7-4), slightly above the peer group average of 18%. United’a high amortization costs could be 
seen in relation to the frequent manager changes since 2013, with every new manager buying 
new high-prized players to build their own squad. Because of the club’s strategy of investing 
in youth players, amortization-to-revenue is expected to diminish after the reshaping of the 
squad is complete in “a few years”. Since the restructure period will likely see a few profiled 
high-priced players coming in, amortizations will remain at 20% until 2022 and from there 
decline to 19%, in between own average and peer average. 
 
Other operating costs 
As the most stable cost group, other operating costs is expected to continue at average 22%. 
Effect on NOPAT will be +0,5% for 2020 and zero after than.  
Effective tax rate 
The trend of declining tax expenses is due to the previously mentioned reduction of the US 
statutory tax rate from 35% to 21%. Manchester United’s average effective tax rate for 2014-
2019 has been 29,7%, based on calculations from the reformulated income statement in 
chapter 4. With their average statutory tax rate being 31,5% for the period, it indicates 
effective tax rate is relatively close to statutory rate. Kaldestad and Møller (2017, p. 83) 
claims it is acceptable to use statutory tax rate when it does not differ significantly from 
effective tax rate. Whether the difference of 1.8% is significant is arguable. However, a 
complex taxation regime and to simplify the estimation of effective tax rate, the statutory US 
rate of 21% is used during upcoming forecasting and valuation processes. With no expected 
change to the statutory rate, the effective tax rate will not have a material impact on NOPAT 
margin for the forecasting period.  
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Predicting NOPAT margin 
With 2019 ratios as base, table 7-5 summarize above discussed factors’ predicted effects on 
NOPAT margin. To compare, Manchester United and Arsenals average historic NOPAT 
margins are respectively 7.5% and 6.7%. In spite of uncertainties and challenges of predicting 
accurate NOPAT margins, United’s strategy of investing in their home-grown talent and its’ 
effect on various NOPAT drivers, seems to be the main reason the club will hover above 
historic NOPAT margin level. And as shown in table 7-5 it will take “a few years” for the 
strategy to yield results.  
 
2019 2020-22 2023-25 2026-28 2029
Player trading 4,1 -1.1 2,0 -1,0 -1,0
Employee benefits 53,1 1,1 1,0 1,0 0,0
Amortization 20,7 0,7 1,0 0,0 0,0
Other oper. Costs 22,5 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,0
Effective tax 1,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
NOPAT margin 5,7 6,9 10,9 10,9 9,9
Effect on NOPAT margin
 
Table 7-5 Expected effect on NOPAT margin 
 
7.1.3 Working capital to revenue 
Manchester United’s working capital consists of operating cash, trade and other receivables, 
trade and other payables, deferred revenue, and other current assets and liabilities. In 
valutation, it is generally acceptable to assume level of working capital to grow proportionally 
to revenue (Kaldestad & Møller, 2017, p. 77). Historically, average working capital to 
revenue ratio has been -23% with a slight declining trend of 6% (table 7-2). With relatively 
small fluctuations compared to Arsenal, historic level will of -23% is carried on and used for 
the forecasting period. The slight declining trend will be neglected due to expectations of less 
working capital required as a result of more favorable player trading exposure. Creating and 
developing more home-grown talent, reduce the need for buying high-priced players. 
 
7.1.4 Non-current assets to revenue 
The value of Manchester United’s non-current operating asset base has basically been 
unchanged since 2014 and not grown in line with revenues. An adding factor to the asset 
group value is the increasing value of the player squad. Subtracting factors are increased trade 
payables and the deferred tax write off. Consequently, the non-current operating assets-to-
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revenue ratio has seen an yearly average decline of 6% with an average ratio of 187% (table 
7-2). This development is consistent with the club’s strategy of growing from global 
commercial expansion, and not from asset investment, and it is expected to continue for the 
forecasting period. Another factor potentially influencing the future ratio, is a major 
renovation of Old Trafford. Though yearly capital expenditures are spent on both Old 
Trafford and the AON training complex, the club has been publicly critizised for their 
stadium being in strong need of a refurbishment. Unofficial numbers in media indicate it will 
cost at least £ 200 million to renovate their stadium (Forrester, 2020). In spite of being just 
speculations and rumours, it does not undermine the fact that a significant capital expenditure 
is expected during the forecasting period, and it will contribute against the declining asset to 
revenue ratio. Another predicted influencing factor of the non-current operating asset-to-
revenue ratio, is the reshaping of the player squad. With a bigger portion of homegrown 
players at book value of zero, intangible assets is likely to be reduced.  
 
With respect to abovementioned factors, the non-current operating asset-to-revenue ratio is 
expected to continue decreasing, but at a slower rate than previous years. With the 2019 1evel 
of 150%, as starting point, the ratio is expected to decrease by 2% per annum ending up at the 
terminal rate of 130%. Though, there is a significant amount of uncertainty in the continuing 
ratio, it is assumed a certain level of assets is needed to run a football club.  
 
7.1.5 Non-operating investments 
Non-operating investments consists of investment property and cash and cash equivalents in 
excess of operating cash. With investment property not changing much, except from in 2019, 
the non-operating investments-to-revenue ratio changes mainly due to changes in excess cash. 
Assuming investment property portfolio to remain stable, and that the club will avoid too 
much excess cash because of a low return rate, a 18% non-operating investments to revenue 
ratio is expected for the forecasting period. This is historic average excluding 2014 when the 
club had no excess cash, which seems unlikely to repeat considering the level of excess cash 
and cash equivalents since 2016.  
 
After tax return on non-operating investments is expected to be 2.5% for the forecasting 
period. This is higher than average rate of 1.9% (table 7-2). A higher forecasted estimated 
return rate is due to reduced tax rate (2018) and higher proportion of investement property 
(2019). According to numbers from Manchester United’s financial statements 2014-19, 
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investment property have yielded on average a 5.4% profit. If comparing with Arsenal’s after 
tax return on non-operating investments it is historically only 1%. This is because their 
financial statements do not disclose profit on investment properties, and therefore the rate is 
not comparable. 
 
7.1.6 After tax cost of debt and capital structure 
When calculating average cost of debt and debt-to-capital ratio for the analysis period 2014-
19, the years 2014 and 2015 is excluded. This is because of a reissuance and increase of their 
debt facilities at the end of fiscal year 2015 (Manchester United, 2015, p. F40), reducing their 
cost of debt and changing their capital structure as shown in table 7-6. The current loan terms 
agreed upon will remain the same until 2025. It can be argued this kind of debt refinancing is 
common and will happen also during the forecast period. However, due to common 
expectancy of lower future interest rates, the years of 2016-19 serves as a more credible basis 
for predicting future cost of debt. 
 
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Avg.16-19
After tax cost of debt % -5,3 -5,6 -2,7 -3,2 -2,8 -3,9 -3,2
Debt-to-capital % 40,7 46,2 51,7 51,3 53,8 55,2 53,0  
Table 7-6 Debt ratios 
 
After tax cost of debt 
Debt, also referred to as borrowings, is defined as interest bearing liabilities. Cost of debt 
includes all costs associated with the debt financing. The club’s interest bearing debt are 
Senior secured notes of USD 425 million and Secured term loan facilities of USD 225 million 
(Manchester United, 2019b, p. F44). The Senior secured notes bear an interest rate of 3.79% 
and matures in 2027. The Secured term loan facility carries the interest rate of LIBOR plus 
1.25-1.75% annually and is payable in 2025. With numbers from Global-rates (n.d.), the 
average annual USD LIBOR rate for the analysis period 2014-19 has been 1.6% , steadily 
increasing from 0,56% June 2014 to 2.76% June 2018 before a drop to 2.37% June 2019.  
Both Caixa Bank (Caixa Bank Research, n.d.) and The Economic Forecast Agency (n.d.) 
predict a decreasing LIBOR rate for the next 2-3 years.  
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For the forecasted after tax cost of debt, the historic average of 3.2% (table 7-6) will be used 
in spite of a growing trend. This is supported by the assumption of reduced interest cost for 
the secured loan facility as a result of a expected decreasing LIBOR rate.  
Debt-to-capital 
Debt-to-capital is defined as interest bearing debt divided by invested capital. Historically, 
approximately half of United’s invested capital has been debt. The increasing debt-to-capital 
ratio seen in table 7-6 can be partly explained by three factors. Firstly, the reissuance of debt 
in 2015 added to the debt portion. Secondly, exchange rates favoring USD to GBP has 
increased the debt value in GBP. Thirdly, the deferred tax write off in 2018 reduced invested 
capital. If ignoring the tax write off the ratio for 2018 would have remained at 51%. 
Considering the three factors, in addition to no known public statement from the management 
about planned capital structure, the historic growth is not expected to be sustainable, and the 
average 53%  debt-to-capital ratio (table 7-6) for the forecast period will be implemented.  
 
7.1.7 Summary of forecasting 
% 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Revenue growth rate 4,6 5,9 5,8 5,9 5,2 7,4 4,8 3,9 4,6 3,0
NOPAT margin 6,9 6,9 6,9 10,9 10,9 10,9 10,9 10,9 10,9 9,9
Op WC/revenue -23,1 -23,1 -23,1 -23,1 -23,1 -23,1 -23,1 -23,1 -23,1 -23,1
Net non-cur op assets/rev148,0 146,0 144,0 142,0 140,0 138,0 136,0 134,0 132,0 130,0
Non-op inv/revenue 18,0 18,0 18,0 18,0 18,0 18,0 18,0 18,0 18,0 18,0
After tax ret non-op inv 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5
After tax cost of debt 3,2 3,2 3,2 3,2 3,2 3,2 3,2 3,2 3,2 3,2
Debt-to-capital 53,0 53,0 53,0 53,0 53,0 53,0 53,0 53,0 53,0 53,0
Forecasting assumptions for Manchester United
 
Table 7-7 Predicted forecast drivers 
 
7.2 Terminal year 
Terminal year 2029 is the year expected for United to have reached its steady state. Terminal 
value is the present value of either abnormal profits or free cash flows occurring beyond the 
terminal year (Healy et al., 2019, p. 324). Terminal value, often referred to as continuing 
value, reflect excpectations of continuing earnings or cash flows lasting “forever”. For it to 
last “forever” it depends on efficient markets, on which forecasting can be based on, and the 
firm needs to remain in steady state. Expected terminal value is calculated in the next chapter.  
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8 Prospective analysis: Valuation 
The final stage of the prospective analysis is the valuation. Valuation is the process of 
converting a forecast into an estimate of the value of the firm’s assets or equity (Healy et al. 
2019, p. 274).   
 
8.1 Valuation method 
From finance theory it is acclaimed that for shareholders, the value of their equity, is equal to 
the present value of expected future dividends. Discounting dividends at cost of equity capital 
(re) gives following formula:  
 
Equity value0 = Dividend1/(1+ re) + Dividend2/(1+ re)2 + … Dividendn/(1+ re)n  +  PV of 
dividends beyond year n (Terminal value)   (Eq.2) 
 
Because dividends are more a by-product of operating and investment activities, hence not 
revealing much about a firm’s equity value, the dividend discount model is not commonly 
used for valuation. However, the model can be rearranged into other models often used for 
valuation. The discounted cashflow model, the discounted abnormal profit model and the 
discounted abnormal profit growth model can all be derived from the dividend discount 
model. The transformations from the dividend discount model to the other three models, 
produces the equations as follows (Healy et al., 2019, pp. 276-280): 
 
8.1.1 The discounted cash flow model  
Free cash flow to equity (FCFE) can be written as Profit or loss less change in book value of 
business assets plus change in book value of debt. It is assumed constant growth g beyond 
terminal year n. 
 
Equity value0 = PV of free cash flow to equity = FCFE1/(1+ re) + FCFE2/(1+ re)2 + … 
Dividendn/(1+ re)n  +  PV of FCFE beyond year n   (Eq.3) 
 
8.1.2 The abnormal profit model 
Abnormal profit can be defined as profit or loss adjusted for a capital charge equal to the 
opportunity cost of equity used and can be written as follows: Abnormal profit (AP) = (Profit 
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or loss) – re x BVE, where BVE is book value of equity. Equity value from abnormal profits 
gives following equation:  
 
Equity value0 = BVE0  + PV of furture abnormal profits = AP1/(1+ re) + AP2/(1+ re)2 + … 
APn/(1+ re)n  +  PV of AP beyond year n  (Eq.4) 
 
8.1.3 The discounted abnormal profit growth model 
The abnormal profit growth(APG) is benchmarked against normal profit growth and equity 
value equation is : 
Equity value0 = (Profit or loss1) / re +  APG1/(1+ re) + APG2/(1+ re)2 + … APGn/(1+ re)n  +  
PV of APG beyond year n  (Eq.5) 
 
8.1.4 Asset or equity valuation 
The above listed models are direct methods for valuation of equity. An indirect method is to 
derive equity value from an asset-based valuation approach as described in table 8-1. The 
models for equity valuation can easily be switched to asset (enterprise) valuation by 
exchanging equity measures with business asset measures. Free cash flow to equity and debt 
(eq.3), abnormal NOPAT (eq.4) and abnormal NOPAT growth (eq.5) replace the 
corresponding equity measures in the equations and produce Value of net operating assets. 
Accordingly, discount rates must be changed. For net operating assets discount rate is return 
on net operating assets (RNOA). Since RNOA is basically only dependant on systematic risk, 
and insensitive to changes in leverage and investment asset portion, asset valuation avoids the 
problematic aspect of a equity discount rate sensitive to changes in leverage and investment 
asset portion. An asset-based valuation approach has the advantage when comparing 
companies, that the leverage component can be ignored. 
 
Value of net operating assets
(+) Value of investment assets
(+) Value of net assets held for sale
(+) PV of tax shield on debt
(=) Enterprise Value 
(–) Value of debt
(–) Value of minority interests
(=) Equity value  
Table 8-1 From asset valuation to equity valuation 
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In this thesis, the direct equity valuation method is used. Leverage is predicted to be constant 
for the forecasting period, and the investment portion of business assets is relatively small and 
stable, allowing for the use of a constant discount rate for equity.  
 
8.2 Discount rate: Cost of equity capital 
One of the most common used model to estimate cost of equity (re) is the Capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) (Kaldestad & Møller, 2017, p. 154). CAPM, used in this thesis, consists of 
the three components riskless rate (rf), systematic risk of the equity (ß) and the market’s risk 
premium ([E(rm) – rf]) and it is defined as: 
 
 re = rf + ß [E(rm) – rf]  (Eq.6) 
 
8.2.1 Riskless rate (rf) 
Kaldestad and Møller (2017, p. 156) defines riskless rate as a hypotethical return on an asset 
or portfolio that carries no risk of bankruptcy or default. The closest real alternative is 
government bonds. Kaldestad and Møller supports the use of a long term rate, and analysts 
often use expected rate of return on intermediate-term bonds that presumably includes 
expected inflation. Because government bond yields have been driven abnormally low the last 
few years, it is questionable whether current expected return on intermediate-term to long-
term bonds are a good measure for the long term riskless rate. To capture both the historic and 
current level of the riskless rate an average of two measures will be used. The first measure, 
capturing the historical level, is the riskless rate calculations of Healy et al. (2019, p. 315). 
They add up historical (1900-2017) average worldwide return on government bonds of 2.1% 
and European inflation of 1.9% to a total riskless nominal rate of 4%. The second measure, 
capturing the current level, is 10-year UK government bonds. July 1 2019 the rate was 0.81% 
and the trend is falling. After tax average of the two measures gives a riskless rate of 1.9%.  
 
8.2.2 Systematic risk (ß) 
Beta (ß) risk reflects the stock’s sensitivity in relation to the stock market. A beta of 1 means 
the stock fluctuates in line with the stock market. One way to calculate beta mathematically is 
to divide covariance of stock and market portfolio with market portfolio. Nevertheless, since 
Yahoo finance presents assumably reliable numbers, their 5-year monthly beta calculations 
will be used for a beta estimate of 0.84 for Manchester United (Yahoo Finance, n.d.). To 
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support Yahoo finance’s calculations Infront Analytics shows a 3-year levered (equity) beta 
of 0.87.  
 
8.2.3 Market risk premium [E(rm) – rf] 
The market risk premium (MRP) is expected return on market index in excess of riskless rate. 
It is the premium demanded by investors for carrying the beta risk (Healy et al., 2019, p. 314). 
Various opinions exists about best estimate for future MRP, and there seems to be a general 
consensus in line with Zenner, Hill, Clark, & Mago (2008) who estimates future MRP within 
the range of 5-7%. Kaldestad and Møller (2017, p. 171) and Healy et al. (2019, p. 314) both 
arguments for a MRP of approximtely 5%. On that basis, a 5% market risk premium will be 
used for estimating the cost of equity for Manchester United (equation 6). 
 
8.2.4 Illiquidity risk premium (IRP) 
To compensate an investor for the risk of not being able to sell or needing to sell at a lower 
price because of low liquidity, an illiquidity risk premium can be added to the cost of equity. 
With daily volumes above 100K, the risk of illiquidity is considered low and IRP is set to zero 
for Manchester United’s equity. 
 
8.2.5 Cost of equity calculated 
Inserting the above measures into CAPM (eq.6): 
Cost of equity re = 1.9% (rf) + 0.84 (ß) x 5% (MRP) = 6.1%  (Eq.7) 
 
8.3 Cost of equity adjustments 
8.3.1 Adjusting the cost of equity for changes in leverage 
Since ROE can be written as a function of its leverage: ROE = ROIC+(ROIC-Effective 
interest rate) x Debt/Equity, the equity beta changes as a function of its leverage. The beta of 
a firm’s business assets is equal to weighted average of its debt and equity betas (Healy et al., 
2019, p. 316):  
 
ßBUSINESS =   ßDEBT  +  ßEQUITY  
(Eq.8) 
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Since Manchester United can be considered to have a low probability of bankruptcy, interest 
rate will be close to riskless rate and debt beta will be zero, simplifying the equation: 
 
ßEQUITY = [1 +(1-tax rate) x  ]ßBUSINESS  (Eq.9) 
 
8.3.2 Adjusting the cost of equity for changes in non-operating investments 
Business assets normally consists of operating assets and non-operating investments. With 
beta of an asset portfolio still equal to weighted average of the individual betas, Business asset 
beta can be formulated as follows:  
 
ßBUSINESS =  ßNOA +  ßNOI  
 
=  ßDEBT +  ßEQUITY 
 
By rearraning the above equation ßEQUITY can be expressed as follows: 
 
ßEQUITY = [1+ ]ßNOA  
  +[ ]ßNOI +[ ]ßDEBT  (Eq.10) 
 
The measures of equity, non-operating investments and debt are all in economic values. Lack 
of access to economic values and for simplicity, economic values will be set equal to book 
values in this paper. Healy et al. (2019, p. 317) state for a normally healthy firm it is 
reasonable to assume betas for non-operating investments and debt is equal to zero. Under 
that assumption, the next section presents a simplified equation for equity beta. 
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8.3.3 Calculating adjusted cost of equity 
From the economic principle of the beta of an asset portfolio is equal to the weighted average 
of the individual betas, Healy et al. (2019, p. 321) have derived the following equation for 
equity beta: 
 
ßEQUITY = [1+ ]ßNOA  (Eq.11) 
 
Debt and investement assets are to-equity ratios for 2019, assuming it will remain at the same 
level for the future cf. the forecasting section. Assuming non-operating investment beta and 
and debt beta both equalling to zero because of low risk, beta for Net operating assets (ßNOA) 
can be written as: 
 
ßNOA = [ ]ßEQUITY  (Eq.12) 
 
Calculating numbers from Manchester Uniteds financial statement 2014-19 finds an average 
after-tax debt-to-equity ratio of 0.7 and an average non-operating investment-to-equity ratio 
of 0.19. Inserting the ratios together with previously estimated equity beta, resulted in a ßNOA  
equal to 0.56. Inserting ßNOA=0.56 into the first equation gives ßEQUITY = 0,91. Recalculation 
of CAPM with adjusted Beta gives Cost of equity (re) equal to 6.45% , which will be used for 
discounting equity measures in the valuation of Manchester United’s equity. 
 
8.4 Terminal value 
The terminal growth rate (g) has previously been set to 3% in the revenue growth forecasting 
section. Cost of equity (re=rE) was calculated to 6.45 % and T=explicit forecasting period of 
10 years. With values from the terminal year 2029, Healy et al. (2019, p. 329) defines 
terminal values for abnormal profit (TVAP), abnormal profit growth and free cash to equity 
(TVFCFE) as follows: 
 
TVAP =      (Eq.13) 
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TVAPG =  x        (Eq.14) 
 
TVFCFE =      (Eq.15) 
 
Results from calculations of terminal values are found in the valuation summary (table 8-3). 
 
8.5 Performance forecast for Manchester United 
Having estimated cost of equity for Manchester United, abnormal profit, abnormal profit 
growth and free cashflow to equity can now be estimated for the forecast period. Calculated 
numbers are shown in table 8-2. 
 
Equity valuation 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Abnormal profit -6533 -2483 432 35485 36750 42031 35105 35203 37285 28603
Abnormal ROE (%) -1,6 -0,6 0,1 8,4 8,5 9,5 7,6 7,3 7,5 5,6
Free CF to equity 46125 34154 20201 63255 71224 62305 59121 67286 64724 61812
Abnormal profit growth 4050 2915 35053 1265 5281 -6925 98 2082 -8682
Present value factor 0,91 0,83 0,76 0,70 0,64 0,58 0,53 0,49 0,44 0,40
Present value AP -5968 -2072 330 24718 23387 24436 18646 17082 16529 11584
PV FCF to equity 42139 28506 15403 44063 45326 36224 31402 32650 28692 25033
Performance forecast Manchester United £ '000
 
                  Table 8-2 Performance forecast 
 
8.6 Risk assessment of cashflows and earnings 
Because most prognosis fail in the aftermath, the “base case” with expected business as usual 
of earnings and cashflows usually needs to be risk assessed to better present a more realistic 
prognosis of the future. Key profitability drivers, revenue growth and NOPAT margin can be 
adjusted for different scenarios. In the case of Manchester United, the most apparent risk 
factor is the sporting performance. The “bad” year of 2015 with no European participation 
and only placing seventh in the Premier League the previous season, was the only year of the 
analysis period with negative revenue growth and negative ROE. The “good” year of 2017, 
winning Europa League and finnishing second in the Premier League, had the highest revenue 
growth and ROE. Most likely the club will vary between the good and the bad and it seems 
necessary to proceed with caution when predicting different scenarios.  
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8.6.1 The “good” scenario 
In the “good” scenario the club will start winning titles again on a regular basis, as they used 
to under Ferguson. Revenue growth and NOPAT margin will be affected positively. 
Accurately how much, is difficult to estimate. Revenue growth difference between a “bad” 
year (2015) and a “good” year (2017) was 20%. Obviously 10% revenue growth increase 
compared to base case seems excessive. A mere 2% increase to an 6.8% average annual 
growth rate, is closer to historic industry average of 8.6% and will be implemented for the 
explicit forecast period. For the terminal value, growth rate will not be adjusted as it is 
unlikely any firm will outgrow the world economy. NOPAT margin will be adjusted up 2%. 
The choice of 2% because the NOPAT margin difference between 2015 and 2017 was 
approximately 4%. Since historically, United have been a winning and successful team. The 
probability of a good scenario is estimated at 35%. This percentage is based on United 
winning 13 Premier League titles last 30 seasons (43%), adjusted down for a negative trend of 
not winning the league since 2013. 
 
8.6.2 The “bad” scenario 
In this scenario, the club will struggle to qualify for European tournaments, which means they 
will not place top 4-6 in the Premier League. Revenue growth effect from the good scenario 
will be reversed, implying a 2% decline for the forecasting period 2020-29. For the terminal 
value a growth rate of 2% will be implemented as this is in the lower fragment of analysts 
estimation of world economy growth. NOPAT margin effect will be reversed and reduced by 
2%. Probability of a “bad” scenario is estimated at only 5%, which is based on only one “bad” 
season, falling out of top-6 in the Premier League, last 27 years (figure 2-7). It is adjusted up 
to 5% for it being rather recently. Numbers from both scenarios in addition to base case will 
be presented in table 8-3. 
 
8.7 Valuation of Manchester United 
All three valuation methods result in the same estimated equity value. This is because the 
same underlying assumptions are used to forecast profits and cashflows. On the valuation 
date, June 30th 2019, the estimated weighted value of Manchester United’s equity is 2221 
million GBP. With number of shares outstanding 164.57 million, estimated value per share is 
13.49 GBP. The associated GBP to USD exhange rate is 1.27, resulting in a estimated value 
per share, of 17.13 USD.  
























Abnormal profit 415 376 1119 1910 2890 1259 2221 13,49
Abnormal profit growth 1373 538 1910 2890 1259 2221 13,49
Free CF to equity 475 1435 1910 2890 1259 2221 13,49
Valuation summary Manchester United Equity value £ million
 
 Table 8-3 Valuation summary 
 
9 Conclusion and recommendation 
The purpose of this master thesis is to estimate the value of Manchester United’s equity from 
a neutral investor’s perspective, thereby estimating the value per share. Estimated value per 
share is 17.19 USD. This is 6% lower than opening market share price of 18.25 USD on July 
1, 2019, concluding the market share value is fairly priced, hence a “hold” strategy is 
recommended. 
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